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Introduction 

ALAN JAY LINCOLN 
THISISSUE OF Library Trends, “Protecting the Library,” deals with a 
topic that as recently as twenty years ago may have been met with, a t  
most, passing interest. This is not to say that problems of crime and 
disruption were not affecting libraries, but that the problems were 
scattered and generally not perceived as serious. Book theft certainly has 
affected libraries for much of their history. According to Munn in an 
early article: 
When the Persians went into Egypt and withdrew papyri from the 
library of Rameses 11, without stopping for any formalities at  the 
charging desk, they began a practice which has remained to torment 
libraries ever since. Book theft is as old as libraries themselves. It 
might also be listed as one of the original and basic sins of 
mankind ....’ 
In recent years i t  appears that the range of problems has become 
greater and the impact of crime in and against libraries more 
widespread. 
Our most serious problem occurs in the downtown library ....[It 
involves behaviors that] range from stolen car batteries, to indecent 
exposure, to a physical attack on the security guard which resulted 
in his having a concussion. Contributing factors include the prox- 
imity of a commercial plasma bank and a free lunch program at a 
nearby church-sponsored mission ....more serious problems than 
we observed even three years ago. I would characterize our most 
serious problem as disruptive behavior from persons having mental 
health problems and/or criminal records ranging from merely 
Alan Jav Lincoln is Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Lowell Lowell, 
Massachusetts. 
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annoying to violent and potentially violent. We are seeing an 
increase in the potentially violent.’ 
This collection of articles will examine a full range of issues related 
to protecting the library-from the causes and the impact of crime to 
physical and legislative measures to prevent and control crime. The 
suggestions and recommendations offered by the authors vary. This is 
necessary since the kinds of problems that librarians face also vary 
tremendously. Perhaps the oldest problem, as mentioned above, is the 
theft of books. The problem continues today and in many libraries is 
considered a major operating cost. This involves the theft of rare books 
by profit-oriented thieves as well as the theft of expensive but common- 
place volumes by “ordinary” patrons, students, and faculty. Unlike the 
professional thief, others often steal for selfish motives; they “need” the 
book, they “like” the book, they “can’t find the book anyplace else,” and 
so on. In academic libraries, the perceived competition for scarce re- 
sources entices students and faculty to take what they “must have.” Of 
course, taking a popular volume not only improves one’s own chances 
of success but simultaneously reduces others chances. 
As libraries continue to develop their nonbook resources, these 
materials become increasingly popular targets of thieves. Episodes of 
theft are not confined to books. Records, tapes, software and hardware 
have become favored targets in some libraries. At times, these items-as 
well as books-are not stolen but are mutilated, reducing both the value 
and usefulness of the materials. Mutilation may be in the form of 
slashing needed pages from journals or books. In terms of motivation, 
this action may be more similar to theft than vandalism in that the 
perpetrator’s goal is to obtain some desired material rather than destroy 
i t .  We were told of one episode of valuable information stored on 
computer discs beings thrown in toilets by intruders. Acts of property 
destruction also occur with alarming regularity. Buildings are defaced 
and occasionally burned, equipment is damaged, and files are de- 
stroyed. Libraries also are likely to be targets for the so-called “white 
collar” crimes of false billing and other fraud, counterfeit money 
exchange, and theft by employees. The theft of personal items belong- 
ing to staff and patrons also may be a problem in some areas. As we shall 
demonstrate later, it is the unusual library that is free of all crime and 
disruption. 
N’hile property crimes against the library are the most common 
types of offenses, they may not be the most feared. Crimes against 
persons evoke strong reactions from those involved or concerned. Even 
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when a library is free from personal crimes, the anticipation of a 
possible episode can be devastating to employee and patron morale. 
One of the more common complaints from librarians, particularly 
those in public libraries, concerns the disruption caused by “problem 
patrons.” The range of disruptive episodes is limited only by the imagi- 
nation of the offensive patron. Some problem patrons are merely annoy- 
ing due to their excessive noise, movement or odor. One respondent 
from the nationwide Library Crime Research Project provided the 
following example. “The other disruptive class is quieter, but even less 
attractive: male vagrants who arriveat opening time andare ushered out 
the door when we close. We have continuing problems with this group, 
the worst of which is the effect they have on the library’s ambience.” 
Others tend to be disruptive to the normal functioning of the 
institution: 
A middle aged man who comes in with his hands tied together, all 
the while screaming obscenities at staff and public alike; ...A high 
school student who lifts statues from their exhibition stands and 
carries them around the reference room; ...or finally a woman who 
after reading a news article screams in laughter and claps her hands 
over her head.. . . 3  
Of even greater concern are those problem patrons who are a 
potential threat to the safety of staff and other patrons. This category 
includes those who use the library for illegal purposes such as buying 
and selling drugs, making sexual contacts, or stealing anything of 
value. “Voices begin to hiss ‘wanna smoke, wanna smoke?-twice, 
three, four times before a resolute reader reaches the top of the library 
steps.... At least five pushers are holding u p  their plastic bags with 
marijuana and hashish for sale, and some customers light u p  on the 
spot.”4 “The most serious problem we have is the theft of employeeand 
patron personal property, especially handbags and briefcases, by ‘pro: 
fessional’ thieve^."^ 
Crime Patterns 
Why do libraries have so much of a problem with crime and 
disruption? To better understand the sources of and possible solutions 
to these problems, i t  would be helpful to examine briefly some of the 
more general characteristics of crime in the United States. 
To begin with, the crime rate in the United States tends to be 
substantially higher than the rate in almost all other industrialized 
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societies. For example, the 1980 rate of robberies actually known to the 
police in the United States was 243 per 100,000 population. In contrast, 
the corresponding rate of robbery in Canada was 102. Crimes known to 
the police make up  only a portion of the total number of crimes. Many 
crimes, of ten including those that occur in public institutions, are never 
reported to police. Victimization surveys designed to assess the com- 
bined amount of reported and unreported crime show that the overall 
rate of crime in the United States may be two to three times higher than 
that shown by official police statistics. 
Secondly, crime rates have exhibited a general upward trend. That 
is, the increase in crime has been greater than the increase in the 
population. In 1960, the overall rate of crime was 1,887, while in 1970it 
had risen to 3,984. By 1980, the rate per 100,000 had shown dramatic 
increases to 5,900. There may be some good news however. In the last 
three years we have seen some decline in the rate of crime known to 
police. This in part may be due to both the decline in the proportion of 
youth in the population and continuing efforts to control crime. 
Crime patterns in the United States show that most crime that 
occurs is property crime rather than personal crime. For every violent 
crime (murder, rape, assault, robbery) there are nearly ten property 
crimes (predominantly larceny-theft). Yet most Americans tend to 
worry more about the possibility of becoming the victim of a violent 
crime. We worry most about the crimes that are least likely to occur. 
What are some of the factors that are associated with crime? 
Research in the field of criminology has identified many variables that 
tend to influence the crime rate. The ones described here appear to have 
relevance for crime in libraries. For example, age is linked to crime 
patterns. This is true in two different ways. When considering the 
perpetrators of crime, the rate of arrest tends to peak at about age 
eighteen and then continues to decline. Arrests for property crimes peak 
even a bit earlier. Age also is related to the likelihood of beinga victim of 
crime with the peak age being in the late teens and early twenties. For 
most crimes, including the serious offenses, there is a continuous 
decline in victimization rates after the peak age. 
As was mentioned, crime rates have become increasingly high over 
the last several decades. This means that the younger members of our 
society have never experienced an environment with relatively low 
crime rates. These high crime rates and the continuous exposure to 
crime and news about crime have become a normal and expected part of 
life for the young in our society. 
Crime data show that in addition to being young, being male is 
linked to the likelihood of being involved with crime, either as a 
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perpetrator or as a victim. Males tend to be arrested about ten times as 
often as females with the differences being greatest for violent crimes. 
When considering the victims of crime, except for rape and purse 
snatching, males are more likely to be involved. Males are assault and 
robbery victims about twice as often. 
There also are some geographical differences in crime patterns. 
Crime rates vary by state and by region of the country. For example, the 
crime rates in Nevada, Florida and Arizona are about three times higher 
than those in North and South Dakota and West Virginia. Regional 
differences also can be significant, but the greatest regional variations 
are seen when examining the different types of crimes as opposed to the 
total crime rate. 
Among the more striking features of crime patterns are the differen- 
ces between urban, suburban, and rural crime rates. As expected, urban- 
ized areas have higher rates of crime, but the magnitude of these 
differences may be surprising. The rate of violent crimes in the largest 
cities is about seven times greater than that found in cities and towns 
with less than 10,000 people. However, the rates of property crimes are 
less than twice as great in major cities compared with the smallest cities. 
When considering how to protect the library from crime and dis- 
ruption it is important toassess the local situation. The general patterns 
described above should serve as guidelines to help the library adminis- 
trator tune in to local problems. 
Crime in Public Places 
The problems faced by many libraries today are not insurmountable. 
In fact, compared with other public institutions, problems of disrup-
tion may be less serious in the library. This does not mean that trouble 
can or should be ignored in the hope that i t  will goaway. Rather, local 
problems should be attended to-promptly, fairly, and firmly.6 
One of the underlying reasons for many of the problems faced by 
libraries is that the institutions often fall into the category of “public 
places.” What is meant by the concept “public place?” 
The term public place is not as simple to define as i t  appears....we use 
two sets of criteria to classify a location. First, let us consider the 
ownership of the location. The area in question may be either pri- 
vately or  publicly owned. This is the common use of the term public. 
On the public side we find settings such as municipal parks, muse- 
ums, libraries, police departments, fire stations, city hospitals, and so 
on. Although these places share the trait of public ownership, they 
differ in the way that they treat the public. This brings us to the second 
criterion, whether access by the public is encouraged or discouraged. 
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Libraries, mass transit facilities, parks, and museums encourage 
access by the public. In fact, their very existence usually is dependent 
on public use and support. Police departments, fire stations, and 
government agencies are publicly owned, but the public is, generally 
speaking, not particularly welcome. Actually, these institutionsfunc- 
tion more efficiently when access to the public is limited. 
Whatabout the “private” side ...? Clearly, the public isnot restricted 
from all the locations described here ....Privately owned settings often 
encourage as much or even more access than do the institutions 
described as public. Movies, theaters, sports stadiums, and other 
entertainment facilities must have easy access by the paying pub- 
lic....The open door policy of religious institutions was noteworthy 
until fairly recently. But crime and the fear of crime have caused many 
churches and synagogues to institute a more restricted access policy. 
The clearest example of privately held property from which the 
public generally is excluded is “home” ....Many businessesand offices 
also restrict public access. In fact, most non-commercial establish- 
ments have some type of visitor control policy today.7 
A great deal of the crime that occurs in the United States takes place in 
public settings. Administrators should be attentive to these trends and 
the inherent risks and implement appropriate crime prevention 
programs. 
Risk Factors in the Library 
There are a number of factors that may facilitate the likelihood of 
crime and disruption in libraries. Chief among these for public libraries 
and many academic libraries is the ease of access. Many of the problems 
of theft and most of the problems caused by problem patrons are 
exacerbated by the ease of access. During our national study of crime in 
libraries, one theme expressed over and over again was the problem 
generated by open access. One library director sent a copy of a sign that 
was displayed in the building: “This is a public library-protect your 
property!” Academic and special libraries have varying degrees of vis-
itor and patron controls which help to control some of the problems 
found in the public libraries. The ease of access is not the only risk factor 
to be considered. The schedules of many libraries may facilitate crime 
and disruption. Often the library is the only public building that is open 
after dark or on weekends. The late-night hours can be particularly 
problematic. 
In addition, most libraries contain valuable and easily sold items, 
including books, A.V. equipment and materials, cash, artwork, 
antiques, and so on. Many of the libraries that experience substantial 
problems with crime and disruption have a high proportion of 
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“patrons” that are young. Since the young are disproportionately 
involved with crime, their presence in the library may represent a risk 
factor and necessitate adopting appropriate security measures. In fact, 
the relative lack of security measures is an additional risk factor for 
many libraries. Along with the need for security measures, most library 
professionals have not yet perceived the need for training in personal 
and property crime-prevention techniques. 
There also are several psychological factors that may contribute to 
crime in libraries. Initially, there is the perception held by many poten- 
tial thieves and vandals that the library is a “safe target”: one in which 
there are both “good pickings” and a relatively low probability of 
apprehension and prosecution. Secondly, there are many who would 
consider themselves as noncriminal, but who are in reality committing 
crimes against the library. Borrowers who never return books or take 
them without proper processing because “it’s not like stealing” are 
examples of the “honest thief.” Finally, librarians themselves are often 
too tolerant of behavior that administrators/managers of other facilities 
would quickly label theft. Books may be considered “long overdue” or 
“lost”-but not stolen. It is important to differentiate between legiti- 
mate and illegitimate behavior within the library setting. 
Current Selections 
In the articles that follow, the authors examine a variety of prob-
lems and possible solutions that may prove useful in a variety of library 
settings. John T .  Kirkpatrick, a criminologist, examines the nature of 
crime and crime causation. Focusing on property and violent crime, he 
describes three bodies of theory that can help to explain the origins of 
crime: biological, psychological, and sociological. The latter two 
approaches are shown to have the greatest relevance for library adminis- 
trators. The implications of these theories for controlling crime in the 
library are developed to help guide those responsible for security within 
the institution. 
Alice Bahr’s comprehensive article on electronic security begins 
with a brief historical review of the development and use of electronic 
detection systems. A discussion of the effectiveness and potential draw- 
backs of the systems is followed by illustrations of cost-effectiveness. 
Determining whether an electronic security system is needed is 
addressed by suggesting both informal and more systematic research 
guidelines. Varieties of operating principles and the advantages and 
disadvantags of each type are described. Recent developments in both 
systems and the ways in which systems are being used follows. Bahr 
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points out the importance of the link between security needs in retailing 
and those in libraries. 
Richard Boss’s article on security practices begins with a brief 
survey of major episodes of crime and then turns to the issue of respond-
ing to losses. Concerns are raised about the typical reactive response to 
crime as opposed to a proactive response. Defining security needs in a 
broad manner is stressed. This includes assessing the weak points in the 
security programs. Weaknesses may involve physical security mecha- 
nisms or the lack of items, but also may include library policies and 
procedures. A practical and systematic security audit which can be 
adapted by many types of libraries is described in detail. Boss concludes 
with a discussion of the cost factors involved in securing a facility and 
the possible complications introduced by the “human element.” 
Focusing on a more specific problem John Morris, an expert on 
arson and loss control, points out that the majority of library fires are 
incendiary. Most of these tend to be set by young males. The necessity for 
proper protection (including intrusion alarms) is stressed. The advan- 
tages and disadvantages of automated fire suppression systems are dis- 
cussed as are the various options available to libraries. Special systems 
most appropriate for rare and special collections are explained. 
Donald Ungarelli provides a history of the development of insur-
ance as well as a brief overview of the modern insurance industry. His 
discussion of the “loss factor” in the library inrludes the role of natu-
rally occurring and intentional acts that can affect libraries. According 
to Ungarelli, too many administrators still hold the view that insurance 
and loss prevention are expensive luxuries. The importance of risk 
management, along with that of securing adequate coverage, is empha- 
sized. Potential problems with validating losses and settling claims are 
summarized. A significant portion of Ungarelli’s article deals with 
insurance options and available packages including attention to rare 
and art items. 
In the selection on crime patterns and costs, Lincoln summarizes 
the findings of the recent nationwide Library Crime Research Project. 
Basic patterns for a variety of crime episodes are described. This is 
followed by estimates of losses and the description of security use in the 
nation’s public libraries. 
Peter J. Parker’s treatment of statutory protection begins with the 
suggestion that library-specific statutes may be counter productive. 
Illustrations of the strengths and weaknesses of several state statutes are 
presented. Suggestions for coordinating activities with law enforcement 
and court officials are followed by a comparison of “weak” and 
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“strong” statutes. A thorough analysis of legislation in each of the fifty 
states provides a valuable reference for administrators. 
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Explaining Crime and Disorder in Libraries 
JOHN T. KIRKPATRICK 
LIBRARIESAND THEIR curators are charged with highly regarded societal 
duties: preservation of the historical record, protection and dissemina- 
tion of culture in all its forms and flavors, and compilation and trans- 
mission of knowledge. However, libraries have fallen prey to the rising 
tide of criminal activity threatening individuals and institutions alike. 
Recurrent crime in libraries, and its attendant encroachment upon the 
services offered therein greatly interfere with their ability to serve con- 
stituents and patrons. To understand the nature of the crime and the 
criminal, those affected have often turned to social science and tradi- 
tional theories of deviance. 
The noted French sociologist Emile Durkheim once speculated 
that deviance is inevitable in all societies.’ Deviance and conformityare 
relative functions of human affairs. This is not difficult to grasp. In the 
physical environment, for example, hot is inextricably tied to cold, as is 
fluidity to solidity. Similarly, in the social environment, licit behavior 
implies a possibility of illicit behavior. Even in a society of saints, 
Durkheim argued, deviance would arise; to a large extent saints and 
sinners owe their separate identities to each other. 
Certain practical results flow from Durkheim’s assumption. If 
deviance is unavoidable, society would do better to direct its resources 
and energies toward devising methods of identifying and controlling its 
manifestations than toward eradicating i t  altogether. The success of 
that investigation depends in large part on the Durkheimian assump- 
John T. Kirkpatrick is Assistant to the Dean, College of Liberal Arts, the University of 
New Hampshire. 
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tion about the nature of deviance. Saintly and sinful behavior are but 
two ends of the range of human action. Between saints and sinners is a 
common bond of humanity. Social science relies upon a willingness to 
exploit that bond to understand one another and the forces behind our 
behavior. 
Classification of Crime 
As a prelude to any discussion of the solutions to deviance, i t  is 
necessary to understand the nature of the crime itself. One working 
definition of crime isany sequence of behavior willfully directed toward 
the injury of persons or property, proscribed by formal law and for 
which there are prescribed penalties2 Criminologists have devised a 
variety of systems to classify crime. One scheme looks to its offenders 
and victims; much is made of the distinction between white collar crime 
and street crime, for instance. Crime may also be classified by its degree 
of politicization, economic impact, seriousness, frequency of occur-
rence, or demographic characteristics, such as age, race and sex of 
offenders and victim^.^ The utility of these typologies varies, and in the 
end, their usefulness often depends upon the kinds of questions about 
crime one needs to answer. The classification used in this article divides 
crime into two broad types; property and violent offense^.^ The two can 
be easily distinguished by the direct object of the illicit behavior. The 
object of violent crime is a person-criminal homicide, rape, and 
assault are all violent offenses. The objects of property crime are prop- 
erty and service; larcenyltheft, embezzlement, and fraud are some exam- 
ples. Robbery, a unique case, is both a violent and property crime since 
it involves the taking of goods through force or threat of force. 
Most library crime appears to be against property. The most com- 
mon may be theft and mutilation of materials, including books, period- 
icals, journals, texts, microfiche, and the equipment which makes these 
items accessible, such as microfiche readers and card c a t a l ~ g s . ~  The 
equally destructive, but often more dramatic, crimes of arson and van- 
dalism also affect libraries.6 There are some reports of violent offenses as 
well.’ And there are other activities which do not fit neatly into the 
violent/property typology-e.g., public sexual activity and drug traffic, 
as well as disorderly conduct. The perpetrators of these last crimes have 
been characterized by some as “problem patrons.”* 
Although the occasional violent criminal and problem patron can 
be agitants within the library and its surrounding community, i t  is 
property crime that threatens the essential functions of the library. 
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Theft and mutilation strike at the very core of the library: the material 
representation of culture and knowledge. Criminological theory and 
research may help identify the human factors which lie behind such 
destructive behavior and suggest suitable solutions. 
Criminological Theories 
Criminologists seek to identify the causes of crime and to under- 
stand the various mechanisms of social control. They do this largely 
through the formulation and testing of theoretical paradigms. Crimi- 
nology is not only an interdisciplinary enterprise, but like many scien- 
ces, is multiparadigmatic as well. There are several rather divergent 
theoretical models that attempt to explain crime. No single model is a 
perfect “fit” with reality and it is the weight of the empirical evidence 
which ultimately determines a model’s strength. The more a theory 
accommodates the range and depth of human behavior, the stronger it 
becomes. 
There are three broad theoretical groupings in criminology, attest- 
ing to its multiparadigmatic status. The first of these we might call 
biological theories of crime. Biological theories look to the peculiar 
physical constitutions of criminals and noncriminals to explain behav- 
ioral differences between the two groups. Some researchers, for exam- 
ple, have linked abnormal genetic compositions with ~r iminal i ty .~ 
Others have identified specific biochemical imbalances among criminal 
samples.” Still others have examined the nutritional content in the diets 
of criminals in an effort to explain their transgressions.” 
As one might imagine, biological research is quite controversial in 
the discipline at present. The empirical evidence pertaining to biology 
and crime is arguably mixed. Proponents of such research are dishear- 
tened by the ardent skepticism of their scholarly peers and a largely 
unarcepting public.” Perhaps i t  is the behavioral determinism implicit 
in biological theories that is unsettling. Too, the research methodolo- 
gies of the early pioneers of biological criminology were seriously 
flawed and so may have set the stage fot persistent charges of sophistry 
against like-minded criminologists who were to follow. 
We shall not here devote further attention to biological theories in 
our pursuit for understanding of library crime because that paradigm 
offers so little in the way of plausible solutions. While biology may 
indeed contribute to crime in some way, biological theories offer margi- 
nal promise to librarians faced with crime within their institutions and 
who hope to control and contain it. After all, librarians could hardly 
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screen their patrons for proper genetic possession or biochemical pur- 
ity. Such a practice raises profound ethical issues and possibly abridges 
basic constitutional guarantees. Any public policy affecting fundamen- 
tal rights is certainly not within the immediate purview of librarians or 
criminologists. 
We will focus our attention instead on the remaining two theoreti- 
cal groupings. One of these encompasses the criminological attention 
to individual psychological traits and their contribution tocriminality. 
We will call these theories, appropriately, psychological theories. The 
other grouping incorporates the work examining the ways in which 
societies are structured and how these structures might generate crime. 
These theories we will call sociological theories. 
Psychological Explanations of Crime 
The common element among psychological theories is an empha- 
sis upon individual factors to explain criminal behavior. They share 
this emphasis with biological theories. While biological theories look 
to individual physiological, anatomical, or genetic dysfunction, psy-
chological theories emphasize psychic dysfunction or impaired mental 
development. The foci of biological and psychological theories are 
decidely different but both groups rely upon individual-level pheno- 
mena to explain unlawful behavior. 
The body of psychological theory addressing crime may be further 
divided into two subgroups. The first of these involves theories that 
identify mental trauma or psychic pain as sources of criminal behavior. 
The second subgroup we can discuss under the mantle of learning 
theories of behavior. 
Several criminological studies have linked psychological variables 
with violent behavior. In a study of murderers, for example, psychologi- 
cal frustration experienced early in life was linked to lethally violent 
behavior in adu1th0od.l~ This early-age frustration arose from physical 
abuse in childhood, misapplied toilet training techniques, and overly 
repressive parental attitudes toward sexuality, to name just a few sour- 
ces. In a more recent complimentary study of murderesses, similar 
sources of childhood frustration were identified as psychological factors 
contributing to criminally violent beha~ i0 r . l~  
Other criminological studies have explored the connection 
between psychological factors and property crime. Such studies tend to 
highlight flawed personality development. Embezzlement, 
larcenyltheft, and burglary presumably result from improperly devel- 
oped moral and social con~ciences.'~ Researchers concerned with the 
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denotation of the “criminal personality” have attempted to delineate a 
series of psychological traits associated with it. Anger, distrust, poor de- 
cision-making ability, and generalized fear are some traits said to be 
associated with the “criminal personality.”16 Importantly, the per- 
sonality type is linked to a continuum; the presence or absence of the 
type is a matter of degree. The prospect for criminal behavior is 
theoretically greater when the criminal personality traits are present. 
Many of these psychological formulations demonstrate the influ- 
ence of psychoanalytic thought and developmental psychology. Behav- 
ior is seen as an expression of deeply-seated trauma or mental conflict. 
Trauma and conflict are usually described as originating from events 
surrounding the psychological development of an individual. Seen 
from this view then, criminal behavior is not always rational behavior. 
Rather, it springs from an individual’s irrational reconciliation with 
the past and its bearing on current situations. 
The crime control strategies implicated by these psychological 
formulations are appropriately individualistic ones. Counseling and 
therapy are prescribed for offenders. The aim of therapy is to identify 
and recognize the psychological sources of the behavior and to promote 
a healthier adjustment to the present. 
The application of this brand of psychological theory of crime 
might aid in our understanding of some forms of librarycrime, but does 
not offer much comfort to librarians who wish to combat that crime. 
True, we might be more sympathetic to the problem patron who is 
given to the peculiar habit of stealing the shoes of female patrons. We 
might also be somewhat forgiving, though certainly not tolerant, of the 
individual who feels compelled to expose himself amid the library 
stacks. Perhaps these offenders suffer from some psychological malady. 
Yet if this is true and their behaviorsare not rationallyderived, they will 
not be deterred in their misadventures by the threat of penalty. 
What then can the librarian do about the crime that results from the 
psychological problems of patrons? The answer is not much-at least 
not directly. One can see to i t  that community mental health services 
and campus clinics invite access to those who are in need. Support 
might be given to those social programs that promote mental well- 
being, if only by publicly addressing the once hidden social problems of 
sexual abuse, child abuse and neglect, and the like. These are not 
necessarily popular approaches to crime, especially in an era character- 
ized by a zeitgeist of law and order. Nonetheless, we help ourselves when 
we help others who are troubled. 
The second subgrouping of psychological theory involves learning 
principles of behavior. Psychologists and sociologists both have exam- 
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ined the manners in which crime is learned. The promise that learning 
theories hold for crime control strategies rests with the possibilities that 
unlawful behavioral patterns can be interrupted and extinguished if 
certain conditions are met. 
Many in American society worry that the level of violence depicted 
by the various media and in sport has deleterious effects upon individu- 
als who witness it. Their concern is that people exposed to extensive 
violence will themselves grow increasingly violent. As the cycle of 
violence enlarges, enlisting new adherents through television, film and 
literature, the ranks of victims increase and the very fabric of society 
threatens to unravel. For a great number of people, it is a frightening 
scenario. At the root of the concern is the assumption that violence i s  
learned behavior. 
There is some criminological credibility to the assumption. Vio- 
lence does pervade American culture and its omnipresence may be 
partly to blame for our relatively high levels of assault, rape and homi- 
cide.17 Through the shaping and molding by violent significant others 
and primary groups, individuals may be socialized to behave violently." 
In some families and subcultures, for example, violence is highly valued 
as an effective means to get one's way. The preponderence of violent 
customs in everyday American life should indeed give us pause. 
Precisely how much exposure to violence and crime it takes before 
one learns criminal behavior patterns is subject to variation. It may be 
that the learning of criminal behavior, whether violent or property, 
varies along four dimensions: (1)how young one is at initial criminal 
contact, (2)the strength of the relationship between teacher and learner, 
(3)  the frequency of contact with criminal elements, and (4)the duration 
of contact through time. The younger one is at initial contact, the 
stronger the teacher-learner relationship, the more frequent and long- 
lived the contact, the greater may be the chance that an individual will 
learn to behave rim in ally.'^ 
Learning theories suggest that crime spreads through a modeling 
or imitative process. Crime perpetuates itself through a social process of 
contagion. Just as a virus is transmitted through the physical environ- 
ment from one person to another, crime may be transmitted through the 
culture or a smaller subculture, such as a gang, from one to another." 
Crime, much like fads or fashion dictates, can take hold, be culturally 
transmitted, and engage increasing numbers of participants. But just as 
styles of fashion can come and go, sometimes with equal rapidity, crime 
can increase or decrease through contagion. One can learn a behavior; 
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one can also learn that there may be undesirable outcomes associated 
with it. 
Learning principles and the process of contagion may be applied 
successfully to several types of library crime. The defacement of library 
texts in a college library is a good example. Students may learn to 
communicate with each other by writing in books and articles placed on 
a reserve reading list. Often these comments reference negative attri- 
butes of the professor who assigned the reading. Students can also learn 
that the library stock of periodicals is a good place to pilfer articles they 
require for term papers. They may then school their younger peers in 
the practice or others may see the damage firsthand. Information de- 
scribing how one might squirrel a book past the library security system 
may be passed from one student to another, too. Public libraries are 
subject to similar violations. The idea that the library is a perennial 
resource for magazine coupons may circulate among certain elements of 
the public. While serendipitous discovery of all these library uses may 
lie behind the violations, i t  is likely that some are learned by individuals 
under the informal tutelage of others. 
Controlling library crime would seem to be a matter of interfering 
with the learning of the criminal practices and extinguishing the behav- 
ior pattern-much easier said than done. Put simply, crime control 
requires librarians to use learning principles of behavior to their own 
advantage. The most popular way in which this is done at present seems 
to be by way of aversive techniques. Signs explicitly conveying the legal 
penalties for book theft and mutilation are frequently posted on library 
bulletin boards. Sophisticated detection equipment, turnstyles and 
limited exitways are purposely conspicuous in many libraries. In this 
case, the message that library crime is onerous and will not be tolerated 
is implicitly conveyed. Occasionally, a book thief may even be prose- 
cuted as an example of the consequences of such behavior, although 
more than one library administrator will agree that enforcement of the 
law is difficult, if only because of the time and effort required. These 
control strategies are all designed to insure that library crime is not 
viewed as an advantageous enterprise. 
An alternative control strategy might be more positive than nega- 
tive in the reinforcement of behavior. Aversive techniques call for actual 
or threatened punishment when rules are violated. The more positive 
plan calls for the reward of rule-abiding behavior. This does not neces- 
sarily mean that librarians should hand out material awards to those 
who do not steal or deface materials. It might be achieved by expanded 
rights and responsibilities to those individuals who treat the library and 
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its resources with the respect they deserve. Increased operating hours, 
more liberal reserve policies, and access to special collections might 
affirmatively promote desirable behavior even as it rewards those who 
already abide by the rules. 
Somewhere between these two alternatives is a third, even more 
subtle approach. It is based on a hypothesis that library crime is com- 
mitted by some and countenanced by the community at large because 
too little value is placed on the materials and the institution and, in 
turn, too little weight is ascribed to the seriousness of the crime. Going 
ten miles an hour over the posted limit on the highway, for example, 
may be commonly done by even the most law-abiding individual; this is 
not because there is little fear of being caught, but also because there is 
no perception that the extra speed endangers anything of value to the 
society or the individual. If, however, the commuter could be persuaded 
that driving faster than the posted limit posed a very real threat to his 
own safety, the welfare of other travelers, and his car’s new paint job, he 
might decrease his speed. Similarly, if individuals and society were 
educated to place more value on libraries and what they represent, there 
might be a decrease in librarycrime and, equally important, there might 
be a community participation in measures to combat that crime. 
Admittedly, the strategy involves considerable commitment and an 
unrelenting persistence. The public, to which thieves and mutilators 
also belong, needs to hear from librarians about what libraries do for 
them both in esoteric and practical ways, and how library crime affects 
them. Above all, the benefits to be had by a flourishing, active library 
should be continually emphasized to the community. The strategy may 
take the form of a small public relations effort or a more informal 
outreach program. Getting people to use the multitude of library 
resources in the proper manner should be the goal. By directly speaking 
about the larger purposes of the library, rule-abiding behavior within 
the library is simultaneously reinforced. Crime will not be eliminated 
through such a plan, but i t  might become less frequent and severe. That 
mere possibility merits a trial. 
Sociological Explanations of Crime 
A sociological imagination requires one to transcend the individ- 
ual experience and to entertain the structures and workings of human 
relationships. Sociology is the study of groups, communities, families, 
neighborhoods, societies, and all other social constellations of human 
interaction. The driving purpose of the discipline is knowledge of the 
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intricate patterns to human affairs and the myriad ways those patterns 
evolve and work their way through time. Crime is a human pattern and 
sociologists are understandably intrigued with the social forces that 
create and sustain it. 
Since there are several paradigms of sociological thought, there are 
an equal number of ways to approach library crime from a sociological 
perspective. In the interests of clarity and brevity, we will discuss three 
dominant approaches. The first of these identifies existing social struc- 
tural pressures that encourage crime. The second views crime as a 
natural byproduct of conflict in and between social groups. The third 
approach examines the peculiar ways in which coercive control strate- 
gies may actually exacerbate crime. Taken together, the three 
approaches help us understand the social forces that quite possibly 
create and sustain library crime. 
When we hear of isolated reports ofbook theft and mutilation, most 
of us are quick to think it the workof mean-spirited, selfish individuals. 
We believe that the culprits are fully responsible for the wrongful acts 
since they are intentionally violating established rules for their own 
gain. As a consequence, we demand that the rule-breakers be duly 
penalized. While i t  is probably true that most book thieves and mutila- 
tors understand that their behavior is wrong, the actual impetus for 
their misdeeds may lay beyond mere malice and intent; social structural 
pressures can be figuratively forcing their hands. This is why aversive 
penalties and stricter enforcement of the law might not be sufficient to 
suppress crime. Such practices ignore the largercauses. The symptom is  
treated and not the malady. 
Structural pressures take many forms. Each arises from the manner 
in which the economic, political and social institutions are organized. 
To a large extent, structural pressures are not the province of a single 
individual but are the residue of many individuals acting in concert. 
For example, crime in America may spring from the structure of 
our economic system. Our system is predicated on the assumption that 
we compete with one another for financial rewards. However, the 
structure of opportunities available to the competitors is not an open 
one which invites access and equal reward to all. For various reasons, 
not all among us can win; some must necessarily lose. Amidst an excess 
of claimants, certain jobs and professions might be more highly valued 
than others and so are assigned the greater rewards.21 The prospective 
sources of economic and social inequality abound, vividly illustrated in 
real life by the great number of impoverished and middle-income peo-
ple and the relatively few truly wealthy. Frustration and dissatisfaction 
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with life conditions and social stations may encourage some to get 
ahead through criminal actions, such as theft and robbery. 
The close intersection of our economic and cultural systems offers 
yet another source of structural pressures that engender crime. We 
emphasize that wealth and success, widely prescribed goals in our 
culture, are achieved through diligence and education, the acceptable 
and legitimate means to the ends. In American culture it may be that the 
emphasis placed on the goals is far greater than that placed upon 
legitimate means. When such a disproportionate value is given to 
wealth and its manifestations, the acceptable ways in which one may 
attain them can give way to the more expedient means of crime.” 
The structural pressures toward crime help explain behavior such 
as book theft and mutilation. The special pressures structured into 
collegiate life are one illustration. One highly valued academic goal is, 
of course, a good grade point average. The prescribed avenues for such 
scholarly achievement are attentive study and sustained effort over a 
long period. Compounding the pressure is the fact that students are in 
competition with one another for the best grades since the academic 
merit system is based upon a comparative ranking structure. This 
approach places burdens on students and may encourage “shortcuts” 
around the accepted avenues for scholastic achievement. Students may 
clandestinely pilfer reserve readings from the library not only to read 
them but also to make them unavailable to others. Or they may hide 
crucial sources from their peers, especially if several students are 
addressing a similar topic for a term paper assignment in the same class. 
If the number of hours that a library is open are inadequate or inconve-
nient students may tear articles from journals for after-hours reading in 
dormitories. All of these examples of illicit library behavior result from 
an underlying emphasis on goals complemented with a system of struc- 
turally limited opportunities to attain them. 
Many control responses to library crime reflect a tendency to install 
costly security hardware designed to prevent the infractions. This 
method may indeed hinder library crime to an extent but, like many 
existing rrime control strategies, it treats only the symptoms. As we 
shall see later in this paper, elaborate security systems may also serve to 
exacerbate rather than diminish the problem behavior. One must 
remember that a likely cause of some library crime is structural in nature 
and, should we want to discourage it, the appropriate structural change 
should be the focal point of our plan. 
It is unrealistic to expect librarians to unilaterally tinker with the 
venerated system of academic merit on our campuses. However, they can 
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institute some changes in their own discrete province. They can alter 
certain library practices to better accommodate the students exposed to 
the pressures of that system. Library hours might be extended. Addi- 
tional photocopy machines could be installed to eliminate the need for 
journal and book mutilation, taking care, however, to insure com- 
pliance with copyright laws. Money could be allocated for the purchase 
of duplicate copies of the most popular and utilized texts. Professors 
might be encouraged to assign outside readings according to a schedule 
which reduces last minute pressures and deemphasizes competition. All 
of these strategies inevitably require significant financial commitments. 
However, they may represent a better long-term investment than the 
additional security systems. 
The second sociological approach to crime holds crime to be a 
result of conflict within, between, and among social groups. The con- 
flict approach describes crime as a product of competing interests: 
cultural, socioeconomic or political. We might expect violent and prop- 
erty crime, for instance, to occur in urban areas where separate ethnic or 
racial neighborhoods border one another. Conflicting codes of cultural 
conduct are thought to be the impetus for crime in this case.23 The 
reports of sporadic violence from American communities that rapidly 
absorbed Southeast Asian refugees could be explained by intergroup 
cultural conflict. 
Several criminoligists, often tagged “radical” or “new” criminolo- 
gists because of their Marxian analyses, discuss crime as a function of 
the clash between socioeconomic classes. In societies marked by inequit- 
able distributions of economic resources, the upperclasses are said to use 
the criminal justice system as a tool to retain and maintain control over 
the lower classes. Behavior that is defined as criminal is often the 
conduct that most threatens the class interests of the elite.24 According to 
the radical criminologists, this is why so much white collar crime 
escapes official detection and prosecution while street crime does not. 
Political conflict theorists identify similar sources of conflict that 
contribute to crime although they include more than socioeconomic 
conflict. They are prone to allude to power differentials in society by 
sex, race, or age, for instance, as breeding grounds for the conflict that, 
in turn, spawns crime. In this case the powerful use any available 
means, includingthe criminal justice system, to control the powerless.25 
There is some evidence, for example, that when convicted of the same 
offense, women rather than men receive stiffer sentences. The system is 
presumably both protective of and punitive toward women because it is 
rooted in traditional perceptions of the female social role. More women 
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than men appear to escape arrest or are excused from criminal process- 
ing, but those women who remain often receive harsher sentences than 
26
men. 
Political, socioeconomic and cultural conflict may be responsible 
for some of the crime occurring in libraries. The criminal expression 
which flows from this conflict may take two forms. The first of these we 
might call “institutional” offenses. Institutional offenses are those 
which are directed toward the library as a symbol of learning, commun- 
ity, governmental authority, or any one of a number of similar ideals. As 
such it becomes a choate form toward which individuals dissatisfied 
with those concepts or their treatment under their auspices may direct 
their anger and frustration. A juvenile delinquent may express his 
disgust for school authority by defacing texts, or a disgruntled taxpayer 
may steal periodicals as an assertion that public property means his 
property. The second type of offense we might term “blackboard” 
offenses. In these cases, the library is seen as a convenient, available 
public billboard for expression of a variety of ideas, from humor to 
political criticism to advice to the local lovelorn. In this regard the 
library is no  different than other broad-sided buildings-all are appar- 
ently irresistable blank slates. 
A recent example of a “blackboard” offense that quickly involved 
the library as a social institution occurred in New York state. A book 
commemorating John F. Kennedy was defaced, scrawled with an 
explicit death threat against Ronald Reagan.27 The book was appar- 
ently used as an opportunity for violent political expression. Alarmed 
by reports of the threat, the Secret Service demanded the library records 
of those who had recently borrowed the book. The librarian cited a state 
law defining such records as confidential and, not faced with a sub- 
poena, she refused to turn over the relevant records. Heated conflict 
among the municipal, state and federal governments ensued and the 
stalemate was broken only when the federal government produced a 
subpoena. The aspiring assassin was apprehended, but the incident left 
the librarian soured on the coercive power exercised by the federal 
government. She now speaks to various groups about state laws that 
protect the confidentiality of library records. 
The above example illustrates the potential ideological volatility of 
certain library resources and the manner in which social conflict can 
directly engage the interests of libraries. The forms of crime so inspired 
are probably the most difficult to defend against, if only because of the 
impassioned determination of its participants. Librarians might do 
well to be sensitive to the political, socioeconomic and cultural conflicts 
LIBRARY TRENDS 24 
Crime and Disorder 
in their communities and to commit themselves to involvement in their 
management and resolution. 
The final sociological approach we shall address identifies the way 
that control strategies devised and implemented to diminish crime may 
have the opposite and undesirable effect of amplifying crime. This is an 
alien notion to many who call for law and order policies as official 
responses to burgeoning criminal activity. Nonetheless, in some cases, it 
appears that the amount of deviance increases not because of structural 
forces or social conflict in the community, but precisely because of the 
social control measures taken to inhibit it. 
In a sociological study of the Quaker invasion of Puritan America 
nearly three centuries ago, control measures were demonstrated to fulfill 
this prophecy.28 Specific coercive actions were taken by the Puritan 
Colony in response to a small incursion of Quakers. The colony passed 
laws banning Quaker activities. This action seemingly served to exacer- 
bate Quaker activity. Quakers, eager to display their commitment to 
their religion, increased their practice and more Quakers began entering 
the colony. The colony, in response, enacted more severe sanctions 
which further escalated and galvanized Quaker response. Only when 
punishment diminished did Quaker activity decrease as well. In this 
case, control strategies promoted deviance. Any attempt to neutralize 
Quaker activity was perceived as a deeply resented threat to it and, in 
fact, increased its level. 
Other criminological studies have suggested that formal crime 
control measures may inadvertently perpetuate crime. The criminal 
justice system, the official apparatus of justice, may encouragecriminal 
careers by reinforcing an individual’s self-image as an offender.29 The 
further one proceeds through criminal processing, from arrest through 
sentencing, the stronger grows the attitude that one is indeeda criminal. 
If all around you perceive you as a criminal, it is most difficult to avoid a 
similar self-perception. Becoming a criminal then is frequently a self- 
fulfilling prophecy. Once an individual has personally accommodated 
the illicit expectations others have for him, it is likely he will meet those 
expectations and behave criminally.30 Many crime control measures are 
based upon an assumption that if given the chance, people will behave 
criminally. By doing so, they inadvertently encourage continuing 
criminality. 
In an effort to meet the challenge of crime, librarians have increas- 
ingly relied upon sophisticated security systems. While their use can 
often help in the management of crime, i t  could be that they also 
promote it to an extent. Their presence indicatesa general acceptance of 
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crime. In addition, it may also elicit a perception of presumed guilt on 
the part of many library patrons, including those who are not especially 
predisposed to desecrating library resources. It is certainly not a pleasant 
perception to harbor. All around us there seems to be a growingreliance 
upon security hardware; more locks, alarms, fences, lights, guns, and 
guards are used, in malls, shopping centers, parks, libraries, office 
buildings, and homes. To catch the few, all are treated as suspect. A 
general resentment may attend this proliferation of security systems 
and, paradoxically, might find expression in escalating criminal activ- 
ity. Those librarians who are seriously considering additional security 
systems should also consider that they risk a curious calculus of crimi-
nal enlargement. 
The Promise of Behavioral Solutions 
In these few pages we have seen that crime can have biological, 
psychological and sociological sources. Our primary focus has been on 
the psychological and sociological characteristics that, given the weight 
of empirical evidence, appear to be criminogenic. To summarize, psy-
chological dysfunction may compel an individual to behave criminally. 
Some criminal activity might be learned behavior, too-the result of 
continued exposure to illicit elements and definitions. There is also 
strong evidence that crime results from the cultural, socioeconomic and 
political pressures that are built into our society. And some crime may 
arise from the social conflict that is ever present, a heritage of our great 
diversity and apparently bountiful opportunities. Finally, we can dis- 
cuss how the very mechanisms we devise to control crime can sometimes 
serve to encourage it. 
Our national and local efforts to combat crime often pay scant 
attention to the existing evidence on the causes of crime. Most efforts are 
aversive, designed to penalize and discourage unlawful actions- 
intending to severely scold the miscreants and deter all others. No doubt 
these measures are successful to a degree. Active enforcement of the law 
serves to illuminate the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable 
behavior. In a sense, this is the message of Durkheim’s proposition with 
which we began. We know wha t is acceptable through our wi tness to the 
social consequences of behaving otherwise. 
The point is that aversive and active control measures should not be 
the whole of our response to crime, in libraries or elsewhere. Such means 
of control are reactive; loss is suffered before they are instituted and with 
each new criminal incident the call goes out for increasingly expensive 
and often equally ineffective versions of the same approach. It might be 
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more beneficial todirect greater attention to proactive control measures, 
to devise ways to prevent the bulk of crime from occurring. We are not by 
nature, however, a preventative society.31 Too often we wait until a 
problem has frayed the edges of our tolerance before weconfront it. As a 
result, many times our response is untimely, ill-conceived and short- 
sighted. 
There are many strategies of prevention available-only a few were 
suggested here. Prevention calls for a direct assessment of the reasons for 
crime’s occasion and for control measures to respond to those reasons. 
Prevention requires full employment of psychological and sociological 
imaginations to craf t solutions from criminological knowledge. Librar- 
ies are crucial to societal advancement. How fitting that our enterprise 
to protect them from criminal undertakings should rely less on 
ungainly hardware and aversive penalties than on the genius found 
within the very resources libraries so strenuously preserve. 
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ALICE HARRISON BAHR 
Overview 
TWENTY AGO, electronic protection for library materials was YEARS 
virtually unheard of. Only one system was on the market, a metal 
detection system developed by E.M. Trikilis of Sentronic International, 
now a subdivision of General Nucleonics, Inc. Four years later, Check- 
point Systems, Inc., entered the marketplace by installing and testing 
another metal detection system in several branches of the Free Library of 
Philadelphia. The early systems were successful, but problems with 
false alarms and target size and adhesives led to the development of new 
systems in the early and middle 1970s. In 1970, 3M introduced an 
electromagnetic system. Three years later, Checkpoint released a radio 
frequency system and librarians declared the 1970s the age of electronic 
security. 
By the end of that decade, librarians could choose among systems 
available from Checkpoint Systems, Inc., Gaylord Library Systems, 
Knogo Corporation, Sentronic International, and 3M. Other compan- 
ies had developed or were considering developing systems. Innovative 
Systems had designed an interface between an electronic security system 
and an automated circulation system that let users charge out and 
deactivate library materials by themselves. As late as 1980, Sensormatic 
Electronics Corporation, the leading retail security system vendor 
which had tested an early library system, was considering the develop- 
ment of a new one. Despite that flurry of activity and interest in elec- 
Alice Harrison Bahr is Project Librarian, Muhlenberg College Library, Allentown, 
Pennsylvania. 
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tronic protection of library materials, today there are only three vendors 
actively marketing systems to libraries: Checkpoint, Knogo and 3M. 
Knogo has about 300 U.S. library installations, Checkpoint approxi- 
mately 2000 and 3M between 3000 and 4000. 
Concerns/Issues 
Today's security systems, all in at least their second or third genera- 
tions, have continued to change since their inception. Yet the questions 
asked about them remain the same. Are they effective? Are they afforda- 
ble? How do they work? Which one is best? Certainly the most pressing 
question is whether or not electronic security systems are effective. Most 
libraries installing systems report loss reductions of 60 percent to 95 
percent. Unequivocally, electronic security systems work, but there are 
some kinds of library losses they were never designed to prevent. They 
will not recoup unreturned overdues, properly checked out materials 
that are not returned. They cannot control, and in some rare instances 
foment, mutilation of materials. Targets are rarely suitable for rare 
book, map and manuscript collections. Whether targets are 1.5 x 1.5 
inch labels with adhesive peel-off backings or 6.5 x .2 inch adhesive 
strips, they deface valuable materials, are difficult toplace on some, and 
in many would be highly visible. 
There are additional constraints on system effectiveness. No system 
is foolproof, especially against premeditated thefts. If i t  were, reduction 
would be 100percent. Not-so-clever thieves can find and remove targets. 
The tall can hold materials over their heads, the graceful can kick them 
along the floor, the athletic can toss them out windows. Open stairwells 
and multiple exits may frustrate security. After moving into a new 
facility that made exit control difficult, the C.W. Post Center of Long 
Island University discovered a 10percent collection loss.' The relatively 
high level of system effectiveness becomes a compliment to the majority 
of library users, few of whom are premeditated thieves. 
Under the circumstances in which they were designed to be effec- 
tive, electronic security systems work well, and the spiralling cost of 
library materials contributes to their affordability. In 1977 the average 
per-volume price of a hardcover book was $19.22.' Medical hardcovers 
were slighly higher, By 1982 those prices had risen respectively to 
$30.59 and $38.71.4 Even with elimination of volumes costing $81 or 
more, the average per volume price of a hardcover rose from $17.32 in 
1977 to $23.13 in 198Z5 
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Consider a library with an annual loss of 500 materials. Presume 
that within a year 13 percent of the materials thought lost will reappear 
on the shelves. That reduces actual losses to 435. Presume further that an 
electronic security system will be only 80 percent effective. It will save 
only 348 of the 435 materials. Last, presume the library's policy is to 
replace all missing volumes. At a per-volume cost of $23, replacement 
alone would cost the library $8000. 
The average cost of an electronic security system is between $10,000 
and $13,000. That includes equipment, installation, service for one year, 
and targets to protect 20 percent of a 100,000 volume collection and 
10,000 new acquisitions. A library with a single entrance and exit and 
with a collection of 40,000 losing 1 percent of its collection annually 
would pay for an electronic security system in a year. In a special library 
with more expensive materials, payback would be even sooner. This 
relatively quick payback period is shortened if losses are greater than 1 
percent. In most libraries, they are. The estimate of loss in American 
high school libraries is between 5percent and 10 percent per year of total 
collections (see table 1 for relative cost comparisons).6 
Determining the Need 
While effectiveness and affordability are basic questions, a more 
important one is often lost in the shuffle. Does the library need an 
electronic security system? Substantial loss alone does not warrant 
purchase. Need should be gauged not only by the extent but by the 
nature of losses that can be attributed to theft. Determining either or 
both requires collection study. Studies can be informal. How many 
materials purchased two years ago are still available? Has the annual 
search file grown substantially over the years? How about high-demand 
subject areas? Are materials either on the shelves or in circulation? How 
many nonprint materials are missing? These less formal means offer a 
rough justification for the expense of an electronic security system. But 
more formal studies can be designed to answer the following important 
questions: (1)how great is the extent of overall loss? (2)how great is the 
extent of annual loss? (3) how much losscan beattributed to theftrather 
than to unreturned overdues, legally borrowed materials that will even- 
tually be returned, and to material mutilation? (4) how many stolen 
titles would the library choose to replace? and (5) what type of material 
or what subjects are most frequently stolen?' 
The nature of loss requires as much study as does the operation of 
available systems. Answering questions about both is the quickest way 
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to determine which system is best. Which is best is a function of need. If 
most loss results from mutilation, for example, there are options other 
than electronic protection. Closed stacks often are preferred-and for 
more than one reason. American University houses journals in closed 
stacks not only to reduce theft and mutilation but to gauge use for 
collection evaluation studies. Other libraries with a high incidence of 
journal mutilation rely on other forms of surveillance, such as video 
cameras and regular stack patrols. At regular intervals, staff members 
walk through the library and ask patrons if they need help. To minimize 
theft of audiovisual materials at least one communitycollege duplicates 
some audiovisual materials, and originals remain in the library in 
closed stacks. 
The need for an electronic security system depends as well on 
building plans, automation plans, alterations in routine processing 
procedures, and staff support. And last, it entails an understanding of 
the different ways in which currently available systems work. 
How Current Systems Work 
Currently available electronic security systems operate in basically 
the same way. In all, special targets are placed in or on library materials. 
In all, patrons exit the library by walking between sensing screens, units 
or columns. These screens are equipped to detect the presence of targets 
that have not been deactivated. Active targets trigger audio/visual 
alarms and result in exit gates or turnstiles locking. 
These systems operate in one of two modes: bypass and full- 
circulating. In the bypass mode, desk attendants bypass the system by 
passing materials behind the sensing screens to exiting patrons. The 
targets are never deactivated. This mode is less expensive since no  
equipment is required to activate or deactivate targets. It is recom- 
mended in libraries where patrons check materials out and return with 
them only when they are due. In a full-circulating mode, targets are 
activated and deactivated. This mode is recommended for libraries 
whose patrons return frequently with previously checkedout materials. 
Despite some similarities, there are a number of operational differ- 
ences among systems. Most are related to the principle upon which the 
systems operate. Currently available library systems operate on one of 
two principles: electromagnetism and radio frequency. Knogo and 3M 
offer electromagnetic systems to libraries. For a long time, Checkpoint 
marketed the only radio frequency library system. In 1984, 3M intro- 
duced one called Echotag. 

































































































































































































































































































































































































The operating principle determines where targets are placed, what 
materials are protected, the extent of downtime and false alarms, the 
width of aisles, the means of system compromise, and compatibility 
with online systems. In a radio frequency system, targets-usually two 
inches square-have tiny circuits in them. Sensing screens contain 
antennas. The deactivation process is manual. Targets must be placed 
where they can be shielded by deactivating date due cards or date due 
stickers. In electromagnetic systems, on the other hand, targets are 
magnetized or deactivated electronically. Strips-6.5 inches long with 
adhesive backings on one or both sides-are placed in spines of mate-
rials or between pages. 
Electromagnetic and radio frequency systems protect different 
types of material in different ways. In a bypass mode, all systems protect 
any materials that can be targeted and carried from the library between 
sensing screens. In the electromagnetic systems' full-circulating mode, 
however, there is a danger of data loss on audio, video, and computer 
tapes brought in contact with activation/deactivation units. Some users 
report interference with watches brought in contact with these activa- 
tion/deactivation units. Video terminals (CRTs) may be placed too 
close to units, which prevents active targets from triggering alarms. The 
Biomedical Library at the University of California in Los Angeles 
suffered minimal temporary difficulty when its circulation system 
CRTs were placed too close to the activatioddeactivation units of its 
electromagnetic security system. 
There is no conclusive evidence that all electromagnetic systems 
incur more downtime than radio frequency systems; however, the May/ 
June 1979 Library Technology Reports indicates fewer false alarms in 
radio frequency systems-one every five days as opposed to one every 
three and a half hours in electromagnetic systems.' 
Present and future procedures for charging and discharging mate- 
rials have some bearing on the capability of an electronic security system 
to complement other procedures and systems within the library. In the 
full-circulation mode, the Checkpoint System and the 3M Echotag are 
designed to work with circulation systems using book pockets and date 
due cards. Most automated circulation systems eliminate the need for 
both. In so doing, they leave the library with the task of finding some 
way to let patrons know when materials are due. The library has the 
option of an auxillary printer to indicate due date or it can forego the 
added benefit of not having to open materials to check them out and 
continue using book pockets and date due cards. 
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Developments 
In the future, libraries can expect systems to be more streamlined 
and less expensive. Increasingly, they will be designed to meet special 
security needs. These changes will result not only from growing vendor 
commitment to retail operations and to product enhancements but from 
changing library attitudes and altered budgets. 
Twenty years ago when the first electronic security system was 
installed in the Grand Rapids (Michigan) Public Library, librarians 
were not always enthusiastic about the electronic surveillance in public 
service facilities. Locking gates and sounding alarms seemed offensive 
and out of place. So did theadmission that library thefts were crimes. By 
the 1970s, however, articles like “Losses Demand Electronics,” and 
“Quick! Tell Me How T o  Buy ...Library Security Systems” were 
9common. 
Libraries began hiring collection agencies to reclaim overdues. In 
1972, the Los Angeles Public Library System started hiring field investi- 
gators to recover materials six weeks overdue. In one year, 7716 books 
worth $42,706 were returned.” In 1975, Virginia passed a law that did 
more than acknowledge library theft as a crime: i t  defined theft as 
willful concealment, exempted staff from criminal liability for detain- 
ing patrons for probable cause, and sanctioned arrests without war- 
rants.” In 1983, dedicated librarians spent hours helping to prosecute 
notorious rare book thief James Shinn, now serving twenty years for 
stealing materials from college, university and seminary libraries across 
the country.” 
Changing attitudes contribute in part to the new look of systems. 
Libraries like the Search Room of the U.S.Patent and Trademark Office 
in Arlington, Virginia (Checkpoint); the Northern Virginia Commun- 
ity College in Alexandria, Virginia (Checkpoint); the Anaheim Public 
Library in Euclid, California (3M); and the Southern California College 
in Costa Mesa (3M) are purchasing the installing systems without gates 
or turnstiles. The immediate benefit of doing this is economic-a sav-
ings of at least $1000. But thereare other considerations as well. Aesthet- 
ics is one, effectiveness another. The metal in turnstiles can falsely alarm 
an electromagnetic system. Traffic flow is an additional consideration. 
Regulating traffic flow is more likely to be seen as a benefit to high 
school rather than to other types of libraries. Gates make fairly poor 
traffic controllers. Out of politeness, exiting patrons often hold gates 
open for the persons behing them. Finally, the absence of either gates or 
turnstiles makes an often ignored fact about library theft quite obvious: 
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it inconveniences every library user. With no gates or turnstiles in place, 
a sounding alarm requires several exiting patrons to return to the 
circulation desk. The absence of these devices signals yet another atti- 
tudinal change among librarians. It is a sophisticated attitude, one that 
admits the existence of theft, the library’s role toprevent it, and theneed 
to be flexible in doing so. 
Another factor influencing new developments in library systems is 
retail trade. Both Checkpoint and 3M entered the security market with 
systems for libraries only. Checkpoint’s sales are now 25 percent to 
libraries and 75 percent to retail establishments and 3M’sretail commit- 
ment grows steadily. T h i s  commitment has led to product develop- 
ments that increase a library’s options. For instance, stores in malls 
require aisle widths greater than the 32 inches permitted by electromag- 
netic systems. Checkpoint can accommodate a three-to-five foot aisle. 
Target size determines the distance. 3M’sEchotag permits three-to-four- 
foot protection on both sides of a single screen. 
Not just the distance between screens but their placement has also 
been affected. In some stores, as in libraries, sensing screens or columns 
flank entrances and exits. In others, the screens are placed overhead and 
out of sight. Checkpoint has just developed an overhead and floor 
detection system for the retail market. It is likely that a comparable 
system will soon become available to libraries. 
The deepening commitment of vendors to the retail market also 
opens up  other potential operating configurations. For example, 3M 
makes a small deactivation-only unit for bookstores, the 930. It costs 
$75, about $1400 less than the cost of 3M’s 950 which activates, deacti- 
vates and indicates whether or not materials are targeted. Knogo’s wand 
sensitizer does the same thing as the 3M 930 and costs $350. The com- 
pany gives away a strip identifier-a unit that indicates whether or not 
targets are present. These single-function units were designed for retail- 
ers and bookstore operators who need only to deactivate materials upon 
point of sale. Libraries using a full-circulating mode need todeactivate, 
reactivate and identify targeted materials. However, the presence of such 
small deactivation units a t  reduced costs holds some promise that less 
expensive reactivation units might also be developed. 
Small libraries and small special libraries will benefit most from 
developments aimed at smaller retail operations. These libraries can 
expect more compact, streamlined, portable systems. They will also be 
less expensive. While 3M’s electromagnetic systems require dedicated 
lines, its Echotag plugs in and costs about $3200. 
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Special consideration has already been given to the small libraries, 
like medical libraries, whose patrons have twenty-four hour access to 
collections. There is a Checkpoint System in the Veteran’s Administra- 
tion Center Library (Brooklyn, New York) that signals an alarm at the 
hospital security desk and locks library doors when someone attempts to 
exit with library materials during hours when the library is closed. It 
alerts a hospital guard to watch a monitor directed at patrons leaving 
the library with materials. The 3M can link security systems, cameras 
and photocopiers. 
Larger libraries will continue to benefit from ongoing product 
enhancements. Already, sensing screens have become more streamlined, 
targets have become smaller, and detection has improved. Recently, 
Knogo improved its system’s electronics to reduce overheating and to 
minimize service calls. Its Mark VIII has slightly higher sensing screens 
to provide a detection zone from ankle height to fifty-six inches, the area 
in which targets may be detected. In April, Checkpoint introduced a 
dual-frequency system. Until then, early Checkpoint System users could 
not take advantage of smaller targets like the Teeny Beeper (2 x2inches) 
and the Stikker (1.5 x 1.5 inches) because they operated in an 8.2 Mhz 
frequency system. Earlier systems had larger targets that operated in a 
4.5 Mhz or 5.0 Mhz frequency. Checkpoint’s dual-frequency transmitter 
board allows early customers to switch to smaller targets without retar- 
geting previously protected materials. 
Conclusion 
The challenge for libraries today is not just to keep abreast of 
product developments and library security needs, but to anticipate 
changes in those needs and to encourage vendors to keep pace with 
them. Chester Pletzke, director of the Uniformed Services University of 
the Health Sciences Library (Bethesda, Maryland), is doing that. The 
library, which uses a Checkpoint System in a bypass mode, is currently 
experimenting with the use of a tractor-fed printer to produce call 
number labels in which Checkpoint-detectable circuits are concealed. 
Pletzke cautions that some adjustments are necessary. Smaller labels do 
not feed into the printer. The process, however, has potential for inter- 
facing electronic security and automated cataloging. Libraries might 
simply request tractor-fed printers with their systems and specify that 
the systems have a capability of producingdetectable call-number labels 
for processed materials. 
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As systems and collections change, so too will the pattern of thefts. 
How else can one account for one library’s loss of a $3700 OCLC 
terminal and the Tucson, Arizona Woods Branch Public Library’s loss 
of 54 percent of its nonprint material^.'^ On the horizon is the question 
of protection not only for nonprint materials, but for microforms and 
computer programs. The  library needs to assess its collection develop- 
men t policies, building program plans, service and technical processing 
procedures, and staff resources to determine the present and future role 
of electronic protection for library collections. 
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RICHARD W. BOSS 
COLLECTION HAS always been a concern of librarians, but SECURITY 
recent publicity about major thefts and vandalism has sharpened inter- 
est in the development of a systematic approach to the problem. The 
most famous case is probably that of James Shinn, who allegedly stole 
rare books valued at some $500,000 from colleges and universities 
around the country before his arrest in 1982. In the same year Thomas 
Freeman, a former Princeton student, was arrested on charges of steal- 
ing more than 3000 books from the open shelves of more than a dozen 
libraries in New Jersey. Only a short time later, some 5600 books were 
recovered from the apartment of Glenn Swartz in Los Angeles, most of 
them from the open shelves of Los Angeles Public Library’s Central 
Library. 
Book theft is only one serious security concern of libraries. In the 
period from 1972 to 1980 there wereat least thirty-two reported incidents 
in which fires were set in locations ranging from book returns and mail 
slots to bookstacks. Of the sixteen arsonists who were apprehended, two 
were library employees. In 1982, an arsonist set fire to the Hollywood 
Branch of the Los Angeles Public.Library and caused some $3.5 million 
in damage, including the destruction of more than 65,000 volumes. 
Other forms ofvandalism are generally not as well documented as fires, 
but their incidence is even greater. 
Richard W. Boss is senior consultant, Information Systems Consultants, Bethesda, 
Maryland. 
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Losses 
While there has been no national inventory to determine the extent 
of losses suffered by the nation’s libraries from theft and vandalism, 
estimates range as high as $250 million a year. Individual institutions 
have reported collection loss rates of 3 percent and more per year. When 
this is compared with gross acquisition rates of 5 percent or less per year, 
the effect is staggering. Even worse, the thieves have the advantage of 
being able to steal the best of the selections made by librarians. Loss 
from arson and other forms of vandalism is believed to be 10 percent of 
the total losses. 
Response to Losses 
Librarians commonly respond to losses in a reactive, rather than a 
proactive manner. A common reaction to headlines about thefts else- 
where or evidence of local losses is to purchase an electronic theft 
detection system; the reaction to vandalism is to secure vulnerable doors 
and windows, and install burglar alarms and smoke detectors. 
Electronic theft detection in libraries has become a growth industry 
with vendors selling or leasing 500 new electronic detection systems 
annually. The total number of installations is now over 3500. Are the 
collections protected by such systems truly secure from theft, or do the 
librarians have a false sense of security? Libraries have recently begun to 
install burglar alarms and smoke/fire detectors, but is there any evi- 
dence that this has deterred theft and vandalism? 
While of value in controlling losses, theft detection systems can 
instill a false sense of security because they protect only the entrances at 
which they are placed. The systems stop the forgetful and theunskilled, 
but offer no  protection against a person intent on stealing. A number of 
the libraries that suffered losses at the hands of Shinn and Freeman had 
electronic security systems in place and operational. Nor are burglar 
and smoke/fire alarms fully reliable, because in several of the arson 
incidents reported in the past three years the protective systems were not 
working or had been incapacitated. 
It is generally recognized that any security system can be comprom- 
ised. The targets or strips placed in books to trigger the theft detection 
alarm can be removed, the book or other library material can be 
wrapped in shielding material, or a powerful magnet can be used to foil 
the sensors. Smoke detectors cannot only be deactivated, but can be set 
off again and again so that they cease to be taken seriously. 
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These problems are beyond the control of individual librarians 
except insofar as they can influence vendors to improve the reliability of 
their products. However, there are a number of factors which affect 
security which are within control of the librarian. They are the subject 
of this article. 
Defining Security Needs 
Traditionally, security has been a matter of devising safeguards in 
reaction to specific losses. That is to say, when a loss occurs a new 
safeguard is introduced to protect against recurrence of that type of loss 
in the future. Libraries cannot afford the luxury of continuing such an 
approach; security must be viewed in the broadest possible sense and 
librarians should engage in anticipatory planning. 
Library administrators should define the collection security needs 
broadly, encompassing in the review the security of materials from theft, 
fire, flood, and vandalism. Included in the definition should be protec- 
tion of materials against removal from the inventory by modifying 
machine-readable bibliographic records. This is the area which has 
been most widely ignored. Librarians have apparently assumed that 
their computers function in benign environments. The major concerns 
appear to have been accidental losses of records from errors, omissions 
and natural disasters. The experience of the business community sug- 
gests that security planning should also encompass the protection of 
computer records against deliberate alteration. 
A library should not limit its approach to the physical protection of 
assets through such means as locks, barriers and guards. Security audits 
of several public and academic libraries have revealed numerous archi- 
tectural elements, policies and procedures that seriously limit the use- 
fulness of the electronic security system in those libraries. These will be 
discussed in the next several pages. 
Typical Facilities’ Weaknesses 
Virtually every library has some windows that open yet lack secure 
screens. Library materials can be dropped to the ground and picked up 
later. A single unsecured window can mean the loss of hundreds of items 
annually. On one college campus i t  has been general knowledge among 
students that the “long-term checkout windows” are in the restrooms. 
Emergency exits are also a frequent weak point. Some are not 
equipped with alarms; many alarms are not in working order because 
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they are not tested at regular intervals; and most are located beyond the 
visual control of the staff. Staff in libraries periodically hear the alarm 
go off, but, when it takes several minutes to reach the door, there is 
nothing they can do but shrug their shoulders. 
Libraries are equally vulnerable to illegal after hours entry. 
Ground floor windows without grills, and doors with breakable glass, 
removable hinge pins and without dead-bolt locks are common. 
Fire and smoke detectors are often placed so low that they can be 
disconnected, broken or set off. Settings of smoke detectors often are not 
properly calibrated or maintained so that a person blowing cigarette 
smoke can set them off. 
Computer rooms are often kept unstaffed and unlocked. The key is 
usually on a master available to a large number of people. Most compu- 
ter rooms are equipped only with a single fire extinguisher which staff 
may not be trained how to use. 
Policy and Procedure Weaknesses 
Many of the weaknesses in a library’s security are not attributed to 
physical conditions, but to policies and procedures which aid the cul- 
prit or which annoy patrons and staff and lead to anti-library attitudes. 
Among the policies and procedures that weaken a library’s security are: 
1. 	 Restrictiue access conditions. Libraries with very limited evening 
and weekend hours discourage frequent trips to the library and thus 
encourage theft. The situation may be aggravated by lack of parking 
and public transportation. 
2. 	Keys. Keys to the library are given out freely to users and staff and no 
regular inventory of keyholders is maintained. The keys are fre- 
quently of the type that can be easily duplicated. Locks are seldom 
changed. 
3. 	E x i t  control. There may be no exit control or the control point may 
be staffed for long hours by people who lack the interest and the 
interpersonal skills to be effective in screening patrons. Staff man- 
ning such control points are rarely given any special training for 
their tasks. The flow of people leaving may be unrestricted so that 
people can freely pass behind those being inspected. 
4. 	Unauthorized possession /occupancy. Many libraries lack written 
policies and procedures to guide the action to be taken upon the 
discovery of a person in the possession of library materials which 
have not been properly charged out, or when an unauthorized 
person is found in the the building after hours. In the absence of 
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appropriate guidelines, employees must use their own judgment in 
these situations. The possibility of patron complaints, and the 
threat that employees may be cautioned against overzealousness as a 
result, leads many to play it safe rather than risk offense. 
5.  	Rules and statutes. Library rules and statutes of the associated 
municipality, corporation or academic institution frequently fail to 
address penalties for the unauthorized removal of, or damage to, 
library materials. 
6. Property marking. Some libraries do not stamp all edges and the 
title pages of library materials because of concern about aesthetics or 
cost. Microforms are often not marked at all. 
7. 	Loans and renewals. Short loan periods and/or restrictive renewal 
policies may encourage unauthorized removal or retention of 
library materials as may the categorization of open stacks materials 
as noncirculating. 
8. 	Circulation systems. Policies or systems which do not require a 
borrower to have a library or identification card to charge out 
library materials can encourage delinquency. Circulation control 
systems which use machine- ,but not eye-readable transaction cards 
are open to abuse in that borrowers can switch cards from one item 
to another. 
9. 	Photocopying. Invitations for abuse may be increased when photo- 
copy machines are limited in number, poorly located, ill-
maintained, or expensive. 
10. Security manual. Every library should have a security manual 
setting forth what to do to maintain security and how to deal with 
emergencies. It should include at least the following: 
-Each staff member’s responsibilities for maintaining security and 
in emergencies. 
-Appropriate phone numbers for fire, police, library adminis- 
trators, etc. 

-Location of power switches. 

-Copies of insurance policies. 

-Documentation for recovery after an emergency. 

11. Termination. Security can be endangered by the lack of systematic 
procedures for library cards to be renewed periodically or surren- 
dered when leaving the institution or organization. Similar prob- 
lems result from a failure to recover employee identification and 
keys from departing employees. 
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Conducting a Security Audit 
Electronic security systems, burglar and smoke/fire alarms do 
probably reduce losses, but they cannot indefinitely compensate for the 
lack of an overall security plan. Such a plan can be developed by 
auditing library facilities, policies and procedures to identify the factors 
that may contribute to poor security. A series of procedures can then be 
developed to address the weaknesses. 
Before expending any funds on electronic security devices or any 
other security measures, a library should be subjected to a systematic 
security audit to determine its vulncrability. The cost of such an audit 
will be a small fraction of the cost of the security measures and will 
assure that the steps taken are responsive to local needs, not ones 
reported by other libraries. The elements in a security audit should 
include: 
I. Nature of the community, campus or organization 
A. General description 
B. Size 
C. Degree of isolation 
D. Prominence of the collections 
E. Attitudes of staff and users 
11. Indicators of security weaknesses 
A. Evidence of theft 
1. Complaints 
2. Collection count 
3. Inventory 
4. Random sampling 
B. Evidence of vandalism, including mutilation 
C. Patterns of past losses 
D. Existence of valuable special collections 
E. Vulnerability of building 
F. Lack of key policy 
G. Lack of written closing procedures 
H. Lack of unauthorized possession/occupancy policy 
I. Lack of written access policy 
J. Inflexible loan policy 
K. Inflexible renewal policy 
L. Lack of written termination procedure 
1. Employees 
2. Patrons 
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M. Limited property marking 
N. No participation in theft alerting clearinghouses 
111. Observation of present security points 
A. Principal exit(s) 
1. Location(s) necessary 




a. Full search 
b. Random search 
c. Casual 
d. Purses checked 
4. Restricted flow 
5. Patron behavior 
6. Characteristics of doors and locks 
B. Emergency exit(s) 
1. Visual control 
2. Alarm 
3. Electronic recording 
4. Characteristics of doors and locks 
C. Employee exit(s) 
I .  Visual control 
2. Staffed 
3. Locked 
4. Characteristics of doors and locks 
D. Loading dock 
1. Visual control 
2. Staffed 
3. Locked 
4. Characteristics of doors and locks 
E. Windows 
1. Locked 
2. Secured with screens 
3. Alarm 
4. Ease of breakage 
F. Utility tunnel(s) 
1. Locked 
2. Exits 
G. Ceiling type 
1. Access to security system 
2. Crawl space 
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H. After hours concealment 
1. Ease of concealment 
2. Ease of exit 
I. Special collections 
1. Locked 
2. Alarm 
3.  Characteristics of doors, windows, ceilings 
4. Ease of concealment 
5 .  Ease of exit 
J. Exhibit cases 
1. Secure 
2. Alarm 
K. After hours book return 
1. Capacity 
2. Ease of removal 
3.  Ease of vandalism/arson 
L. Smokelfire detectors 
1. Adequate number 
2. Reachable 
3. Evidence of damage/inoperation or poor maintenance 
4. Ease of false alarm 
M. Computer room 
1. Staffed 
2. Locked 
3.  Availability of key 
4. Back-up for files kept off-site 
5. Fire detection 
6. Automatic fire extinguishing 
7. Use of passwording and other access controls 
8. Audit trails for record changes 
The Cost of Security 
Typically, the cost of a security program for a library with 100,000 
volumes will be $5,000 to $10,000 to revise policies and procedures, 
change locks and install alarms, and repair other defects. This does not 
include the installation of an electronic security system. Larger libraries 
will have to spend correspondingly more. For many libraries the $5,000 
figure represents only 165 volumes since the average item now costs $30 
to acquire and process. The investment is, therefore, almost always 
justified. 
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Nevertheless, such expenditures should not be made without 
knowing the current rate of loss. What percentage of the collection is 
actually lost in a twelve-month period? Most library administrators do 
not wish to undertake inventories to determine loss rates. There are two 
less expensive options: (1)random sampling, and (2)a collection census 
or the actual counting of the number of volumes on two separate 
occasions. Both are described in Alice H. Bahr’sBook The f t  and Library 
Security Systems.’ Libraries unable to reduce their losses after undertak- 
ing the minimum program should consider the installation of one or 
more electronic security systems. 
Cost-Effectiveness 
Libraries should not seek to remedy every possible security weak- 
ness. Cost-effectiveness should always be kept in mind. Safeguards may 
involve a wide range of costs-from no cost to prohibitive cost. A risk 
analysis can determine the potential for loss without the safeguards. 
What is the likelihood that there will be a loss if an action isn’t taken and 
what is the probable extent of the loss? Since there is no rule of thumb or 
standard by which to determine how much should be spent for a 
safeguard given a specific cost risk, the “prudent person” method could 
be followed. The prudent-person criterion is that even if a loss is 
sustained, a prudent person would agree that sufficient safeguards were 
in place to protect against the loss. Therefore, those held accountable for 
the assets should be held blameless. This rule is not particularly satisfy- 
ing or practical, but is symptomatic of the state of the art. 
The Human Element 
In implementing any security program, human costs and reliabil- 
ity should be kept in mind. A safeguard that requires no human opera- 
tion or intervention during its operation is usually superior to a 
safeguard with equivalent protective capabilities that requires human 
involvement. For example, if access to an area can be controlled through 
a simple, logical, algorithmic process and few or no exceptions are 
necessary, then an automatic door-access mechanism could be superior 
to stationing a guard at the door. Manual functions are generally 
weakest in a safeguard. The human element must be assessed not only as 
i t  operates during the routine functioning of the safeguard, but also 
how it will operate when the person is distracted or negligent. 
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Conclusion 
A library cannot eliminate losses, but i t  can reduce them if it 
undertakes an audit of its facilities, policies and procedures and if it 
takes such steps as are cost effective within its range of potential loss. It 
should expect to remain vulnerable to the skilled thief and the malicious 
vandal and should periodically repeat the security audit and random 
sampling of its collection. The library should participate in theft alert- 
ing service for rare books and should arrange with local buyers of 
second-hand books to alert it when materials bearing the library’s 
property markings are offered for sale. If an automated system is used, 
the files should be protected against tampering and a bark-up copy 
should be kept at a remote, secure location. 
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JOHN MORRIS 
A PRIMARY CONSIDERATION in planning for fire protection of a library is 
this unpleasant statistic: More than 70 percent of all library fires are 
incendiary in origin. Other fires originate in malfunction of heating 
plants, in problems with mechanical or electrical systems, in the opera- 
tions of contractors or from lightning. There was a time, 1966-72,when 
political, antigovernment activism was expressed by setting fire to a 
library.’ Then there came a succession of arson fires without any com- 
pelling motivation, apparently related to incursions by children and 
others bent on stealing or mindless destruction. 
1972-80 Survey of Library Fires 
A survey of thirty-two incendiary fires of the period 1972-80 pro-
duced some fascinating information.’ Just half of the thirty-two inci- 
dents resulted in identification of the arsonists. There were thirty males 
and one female linked with the sixteen fires, some acting alone and 
others in teams of two, three or four. The age range was from eleven to 
twenty-six years, and the median age was seventeen. Suspects observed 
but not apprehended in three other fires were called “teenagers,” “a 
youth gang in the neighborhood” and “two young men seen running 
away.” Two employees were reponsible for fires: one, a young woman 
who wanted to call attention to her belief that the stacks were a danger- 
ous place to work; and the other, a young janitor who wanted to be seen 
as a hero helping others to safety in a time of emergency. 
John Morris is a loss control consultant and a registered Professional Engineer in Safety 
and Fire Protection Engineering, Walnut Creek, California. 
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Burglary was the apparent motive in two or three fires but “casual 
vandalism” was assigned to almost all the rest. A door or a window was 
forced, then the vandals went through the building looking for some- 
thing to steal and set fires before leaving. One fire, at New Rochelle, was 
set by someone who broke a rear window and threw burning materials 
inside. 
There were six fires out of thirty-two set through book drops. In 
Pioneer Library at Delta, British Columbia, a fire bomb made with 
gunpowder and gasoline was placed in the book return in broad day- 
light, but at a time when the library was not open to patrons. It 
destroyed the interior, and would have killed or severely injured anyone 
inside if the library had been open. It does not take much ingenuity to 
burn out a library using the book return. A boy dropped in a single 
match at Ceres, California and a $200,000loss resulted. Destructive fires 
originating in book returns have occurred of late in Washington, 
Oregon, California, Maryland, Tennessee, Indiana, Virginia, and 
Texas. 
The survey showed that arson in libraries occurred not only at 
night, but in daylight. Eight of the thirty-two fires occurred between 10 
A.M. and 7 P.M. In only three fires were the firesetters known to the 
library as “problem patrons.” In all others they were strangers. 
Responding librarians had some advice on improving protection 
against fire and against arson: 
1. Review insurance policies periodically 	 to make sure coverage is 
adequate. 
2. 	Insure for the replacement value of books, but remember that many 
local history items may be unique copies and irreplaceable. 
3. 	Install outside book drops and close off any in-building book returns 
from the rest of the library. 
4. 	Install intruder detection systems and sprinkler systems. 
5. 	Keep dated, accurate records of all conversations with insurance 
adjusters to prepare the insurance agent for making a claim once 
damage has occurred. 
6. 	When preventive measures fail and a severe fire results the con- 
sequences can be not being able to use library facilities for u p  to two 
years while they undergo repair or reconstruction. 
It now seems very possible that library fires ascribed to electrical 
faults or “careless smoking” in the past were in fact incendiary, since it 
is hardly likely that the incidence of arson jumped from 0.9 percent in 
1963 to 70 percent in 1972.3The nomination of smoking as the number 
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one cause of fires in libraries, as cited in a 1963 survey, stemmed from the 
assumption of the survey’s authors that causes of fires in libraries would 
“follow the pattern for all building fires.” Since that survey others have 
blindly followed suit, placing smoking at the top of causes for library 
fires. There is little evidence of this. The chronology of library fires from 
1950to 1962 which accompanied the survey listed fifty-eight fires out of 
eighty-eight without any cause or origin indicated (66 percent) and it 
can logically be inferred that a considerable number of these may have 
been incendiary, not just the six fires that were so identified. 
Prevention of Vandalism and Arson 
Reinforced Doors and Windows and Alarm Systems 
The basic physical improvements to a library of whatever size to 
prevent vandalism and arson start with the strengthening of doors and 
windows against intrusion, especially at the rear and on any side con- 
cealed from the street. Another improvement is the installation of an 
intrusion detection alarm system which sends a signal to a central watch 
station when someone tampers with a door or window, or trips any 
device set to detect an intruder. It is important to have a reliable system 
and to have i t  installed by a reputable contractor who will maintain it. 
Most important is the central-station reporting feature, to get informa- 
tion to the police at the earliest possible moment. If only a local alarm is 
wanted, this is available, and be aware that it may alert the intruder but 
seldom results in any information going to the police. Local alarms 
seldom get much attention and thus may be worthless. 
Another alarm system to protect against fire from any source is the 
automatic detection system covering all parts of the building. An auto- 
matic detection system may sense fire through heat or smoke detection 
or both. Heat detectors operate at a fixed temperature or on a rate-of- 
rise-of-temperature basis, and frequently both. Smoke detectors use one 
of several methods to sense smoke or products of combustion and sound 
an alarm quite early in the development of a fire, assuming a fire is from 
a source other than incendiary. A local alarm from this system might be 
useful in the middle of a work day to alert staff people of a fire. In the 
middle of the night only a central station system would get the signal 
out to the fire department. Detection systems are valuable when prop- 
erly installed and well maintained, although their value depends in part 
on the response they generate from the central station. 
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Sprinkler Systems 
Automatic suppression systems, mainly sprinklers, are being used 
in libraries in increasing numbers. Most very large new libraries are so 
equipped. Traditionally librarians have resisted having sprinkler sys- 
tems in libraries clinging to the mistaken notion that water is worse for 
the books than fire, and that having the sprinkler pipes in the stacks 
creates a strong possibility of water damage occuring when there is no 
fire. 
They accept automatic detection systems, and are willing to accept 
whatever delay this may mean in getting water on the fire. Under ideal 
conditions this may be a delay of a very few minutes. But if there is any 
malfunction in the communications link to the fire department, or if the 
fire department is already responding to another emergency, the fire 
develops rapidly and the firemen may have to resort to the heavy hose 
streams that cause so much havoc in unburned books. 
An example of delayed response was the Klein Law Library fire in 
Philadelphia in 1972 when 11,000 gallons of water per minute poured 
into the library and inundated the collections, including rare books on 
English and American law and papers of Benjamin Franklin.4 With 
sprinkler protection this would not have happened. 
The basic “wet-pipe” system, so-called because i t  is always charged 
with water, is a network of pipe fitted with nozzles or sprinkler heads so 
arranged at intervals as to provide a wetting down action for the entire 
area. But the heads open only one at a time, and a very large number of 
fires under sprinkler protection are put out with one, two or three heads 
operating. A review of sprinkler operation in fires revealed that 43 
percent of all fires were extinguished with a single sprinkler head 
opening, and 70percent with no more than three.5About twenty gallons 
of water per minute issue from a sprinkler head in an umbrella-shaped 
pattern. A second head will open only if“the fire is spreading. 
A new development in the 1960s and 1970s was the on-off head. It 
featured the capability of closing itself off when the fire was put down, 
reducing the possibility of unnecessary damage from water. Even before 
this the preaction sprinkler system was in use in which a valve in the 
supply line controls the flow of water. It is designed to open to admit 
water into the empty pipes when a detector senses the possibility of fire; 
the system then acts essentially like a standard wet-pipe system. Another 
refinement of the preaction system was a cycling feature to close the 
supply valve when the fire was put down. This has had acceptance by 
some librarians because the pipes over the books are normally empty of 
water, and are charged only when the detectors sense fire or smoke. 
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Gaseous fire extinguishing agents are favored in libraries for the 
protection of rare books and special collection, since they do not wet the 
books or leave any residues. The first used was C02 (carbon dioxide) 
which was capable of putting out a fire by creating an atmosphere that 
would not support combustion. Such an atmosphere also would not 
support life and this has limited its use to vaults and places where the 
people can be expected to leave before the agent is discharged. 
Halon 1301 has provided the virtues of C02 without the concern for 
safety of life. It also requires less space for storage containers. A 5 percent 
concentration in the air creates an atmosphere that will not support 
combustion, yet people can survive in it. They do not have to run for fear 
of asphyxiation. This is an important point although it must beappar- 
ent that in any dire emergency, it would be normal for people to leave 
the room anyway-at least temporarily. Halon 1301 is being used to 
protect entire buildings in only a few places, such as Mount Vernon, 
Winterthur Museum and Pusey Library at Harvard. 
Halon 1301 has found a home in a great many rare book rooms, 
since it acts promptly-puttingout fire within a few seconds-and there 
is no residue. Yet there are possibilities of failure of this product if i t  is 
not confined for the duration of time needed to keep a fire under control: 
doors and windows must be closed and ventilating systems shut down 
for the brief period needed to insure that the emergency is past. The cost 
of the agent, at several dollars per pound, places it out of reach for 
protection of large open areas in big libraries. 
Rationale for Automatic Sprinkler Systems in Bookstacks 
It is safe to say that nearly all librarians agree on protecting rare 
book collections with Halon 1301. There is less agreement on the 
protection with a suppression system of the rest of the library. Yet many 
new libraries in the recent past have been built fully equipped with 
automatic spinklers everywhere except in the rare book room. Examples 
are the new oversize libraries in Saudi Arabia, the James Madison 
Memorial Building of the Library of Congress, Metropolitan Toronto 
Library, University of Minnesota Law Library, and Stanford University 
Law Library. Existing university libraries have been retrofitted with 
automatic sprinkler systems at Maryland, Rutgers, Berkeley, and Stan- 
ford, for example. 
It is no secret in the library field that some librarians remain 
unconvinced of the need for sprinkler protection over the books. Doubt- 
less there are some who will resist them anywhere in the building, since 
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the pipes (usually) contain water and water is well known to librarians 
for its proclivity for finding its way into the wrong places. But consider 
the experience of libraries with water-damage incidents. In a 1963 
survey, 153 libraries reported a total of 257 loss incidents due to water 
damage.6A few of these were from fire department operations. The rest 
were from leaking water and steam pipes, condensate, seepage, con- 
struction operations, storms, leaking roofs, floods, and faulty drains 
and sewers. In short, there are a great many sources for unwanted water 
in libraries. The most prolific source, other than floods, may be fire 
department operations. This is at the center of the argument as to 
whether an automatic sprinkler system should be placed in the library. 
Given an ideal set of circumstances, fire in the library will be 
detected early by a reliable automatic detection system of the heat, smoke 
or products-of-combustion type, an alarm will go to the central station, 
the fire department will roll up  to the scene, and the fire will bequickly 
located and held in check. In several instances involving libraries, there 
have been failures of detection systems: the layout was faulty, the instal- 
lation was bad, or the maintenance was not up  to date.7 One scenario in 
which the early warning might not be soon enough would be that of the 
fire bomb, even given a prompt response by the fire department. As any 
fire service officer knows, the first five minutes are the critical time in the 
fire; and the officer would be happy to find that a sprinkler head had 
opened to keep a fire bomb in check before firefighters could arrive. 
The best solution for a library is probably a belt-and-suspenders 
arrangement: automatic detection backed up  by automatic sprinklers. 
With this combination i t  would be possible for the fire department to 
get early notice of smoke collecting, and fire service officers could walk 
into the building well in advance of the heat buildup required to open a 
sprinkler head. Conversely, if a disturbed individual throws a fire bomb 
into the library’s newspaper room and a hot fire ensues immediately, 
one or two sprinkler heads will open and contain the fire before the 
firemen can get there. This is particularly gratifying if the fire depart- 
ment is already preoccupied with another fire or with any of the other 
emergencies a fire department is expected to respond to. Remember also 
that the automatic sprinkler system, if properly designed, has its own 
direct waterflow signal to the central station. This summons the fire 
department which can shut off the flow of water if the fire is under 
control and take salvage measures to remove smoke and protect the 
collections. The water flow signal feature is sometimes overlooked in 
discussing the merits of sprinkler systems. 
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Only the circumstances of a fire determine whether a detection 
system alone or a sprinkler system alone would have been enough to 
manage the fire emergency. Together they make a formidable defense 
against even a modest loss. Large public and university libraries in 
many places have this dual protection. 
Library Arson is Increasing 
The library fire experience of theyears 1978-83 again confirmed the 
rising incidence of arson. Although information on library fires is not 
easy to collect, we know about thirty-four fires in this period, only six of 
which (18 percent) were something other than incendiary. A contractor 
operation at the National Film Archives in Suitland, Maryland resul ted 
in a disaster in 1978; a lightning strike burned out the library in 
Scottsville, Virginia in 1980; Perth, Ontario lost their library in 1980 
when a fire originated in the caretaker’s living quarters; and there were 
also three electrical fires. 
In the same period there were twenty-eight library arson fires (82 
percent). Representative disasters were the burning of the San Diego 
Aerospace Museum and Library in 1978, the Hollywood Regional 
Library fire of 1982, and the fire that destroyed the College of the 
Atlantic Library at Bar Harbor, Maine in 1983. A corresponding figure 
on arson/vandalism for all buildings was mentioned recently in the 
announcement of a nationwide arson prevention program.’ The insu- 
rance industry names vandalism as the number one motivation for 
arson, with 53.2 percent of all incendiary fires in buildings, well ahead 
of the number two motive, insurance fraud, which was credited with 
13.6 percent. 
Three relatively new developments in the fire risk of libraries 
should be mentioned. One is the wet book salvage capability now 
available in various regional centers, and the second is improved 
vacuum-drying techniques. Both these developments have somewhat 
reduced the fear librarians have felt about putting water on a fire to save 
the books, and wetting in the process other books not actually b ~ r n i n g . ~  
The third is the adoption in large libraries of compact storage systems in 
which the fire loading of any level so equipped is vastly increased. Fire 
protection engineers agree that compact storage demands automatic 





Libraries are being burned out by vandals. Fires from any other 
cause are rare. The threat of arson can be modified considerably by 
simple physical improvements that can be made even on a “depression” 
budget. It is reassuring to have automatic protection systems and sys- 
tems that report the presence of intruders, water, fire, or smoke directly 
to a central watch station. Automatic sprinklers have advantages over 
other systems in sensing fire-they put water on the fire and alert the fire 
department at the same time. Some libraries have more than one system 
and many have Halon 1301 protection over their special collections. A 
final note: a book drop that is not engineered to defeat arson is an 
invitation to disaster. 
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Insurance and Prevention: Why and How? 
DONALD L. UNGARELLI 
THEINSURANCE CONCEPT can be literally traced back to ancient times. 
The Babylonian civilization in the Middle East was considered the 
leader in world trade of that time. Babylon was at the center of the world 
trade market and became an ideal focal point for goods and merchandise 
brought from Europe, Asia and Africa. Numerous caravans traveled 
through Babylon bringing valuable materials which linked China, 
India, Persia, and Egypt to the trade center. Unfortunately, bands of 
robbers and pirates as well as the natural elements were constant threats 
these merchants faced on their journeys. Losses of life and materials 
were relatively high. The Babylonian merchants charged risk premiums 
on the credit they extended to merchants. Merchants pledged as collat- 
eral their property and their family in exchange for loans on the goods. 
The risks of loss were very high, and i t  was not uncommon for mer- 
chants to lose everything, whereby their families would be sold into 
slavery. Essentially, these high risks caused a decline in the growth of 
commercial trade. 
Insurance History 
Improved trade conditions did not materialize until after the Code 
of Hammurabi (circa 1750 B.c.) .  The Code of Hammurabi played a 
significant role in the development of the insurance concept. The 
Hammurabian Code included the doctrines of civic responsibility, bot- 
Donald L. Ungarelli is Director of Libraries, Long Island University, C.W.Post Campus, 
Greenvale, New York. 
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tomry and respondentia. Ciuic responsibility established that a city was 
subject to payment of damages to victims for acts of violence which 
might have been controlled by the city authorities. Loans in the form of 
maritime contracts on the vessels and cargoes were called bottomry 
(vessels) and respondentia (cargoes). There were three basic parts to 
these loan contracts. They were “( 1) loans on the vessels, cargoes, and 
freight, (2) an interest rate on the loan, and (3) a risk premium for the 
chance of loss of the venture and the consequent cancellation of the 
debt.”’ The borrower was freed of his obligation on the bottomry loan if 
the loss was no  fault of his own. The bottomry agreements became a 
significant procedure for insurance, and were extensively used by many 
of the ancient civilizations up  through the Roman Empire. So-called 
“marine insurance” is by far theoldest branch of the insurance industry. 
Modern insurance practice traces its origins to the mid-seventeenth 
century in Europe. The Great Fire of London in 1666is considered the 
catalyst that established the concept of fire insurance. The Fire of 
London burned for five days and approximately one-fourth of the 
dwellings were destroyed. It was the single largest disaster experienced 
by England in its history. Immediately following this major disaster, 
Nicholas Barbon established an office to issue fire insurance for homes 
and business enterprises. As England began to become the leading trade 
center of the world, the concept of life and health insurance was devel- 
oped. Lloyd’s of London became the insurance capital of the world 
issuing policies on an international scale. 
The French, in the 1650s,can be credited with the establishment of 
the technique of actuarial science which used the theory of probability 
developed by Blaise Pascal. Actuarial science has become the sole 
method for issuing insurance throughout the world and is based on 
estimates of the probability of loss. 
The Modern Insurance Industry 
Insurance is a device to spread the risk of loss among a group of 
individuals who have contributed funds for the possibility of financial 
loss. It is a method to transfer the risk to the group whereby the 
individual alone does not suffer the entire loss. The individual pays a 
prescribed premium based on the probability of possible loss instead of 
facing alone the entire loss, should i t  occur. 
Today, the insurance industry is a rather complex social institution 
employing literally hundreds of thousands of people and insuring tens 
of millions of individuals and business concerns. The insurance indus- 
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try can be divided into three classifications. They are: (1) life insurance, 
(2) health insurance, and (3) property and liability insurance. Some 
companies specialize in just one or the other forms of insurance, while 
others issue all classes of insurance. Property and liability insurance 
should be a major concern of the library manager who is responsible for 
day-to-day operations. Property insurance is protection against hazards 
and risks of loss against the buildings and contents, while liability 
insurance protects the insured against claims arising from bodily injury 
or property damage caused by omission or negligence on the part of 
emplt )yeej carrying out day-to-day operations. Insurance coverage is 
protection against loss, twenty-four hours of the day for the three 
hundred and sixty-five days of the year. 
Loss prevention is a method to reduce the possibility of loss. Loss 
prevention systems-e.g., automatic detection and extinguishing- 
reduce the probability offires causingextensive damage, but they do not 
eliminate fires. Good housekeeping practices and fire safety programs 
can be used to eliminate hazards that may contribute to fires and 
liability claims. Charles F. Gosnell stated, in an article in the Ency-
clopedia of Library and Information Science: 
I t  is well to recognize and remember that all losses, whatever the 
intermediate arrangement for compensation or spreading the risk, are 
losses to society as a whole are eventually paid for by the public at 
large. Insurance is a fine device for softening the blows of loss, but is 
not in itself productive. Productivity occurs when the losses are pre- 
vented, and society is therefore so much r i ~ h e r . ~  
The Loss Factor 
Loss experiences in libraries have been caused by acts of God and by 
fires which were either set unintentionally or intentionally. Hurricanes, 
windstorms, cyclones, tornadoes, and earthquakes have taken their toll 
upon libraries over the last twenty-five years. Basically, most hurri- 
canes, windstorms, tornadoes, and cyclones, are accompanied by con- 
siderable flooding which causes extensive damage. Mud and water 
damage is usually very high-especially to the contents of the building. 
In some instances, the building structure itself sustains damage which 
necessitates rebuilding or renovation. Acts of God are not predictable, 
but insurance coverage is just one method of protection against finan- 
cial loss. 
A fire in a library is still the single most menacing threat because of 
the destruction caused to both the building and its contents. Beside the 
actual fire-which may or may not destroy everything-smoke and 
SUMMER 1984 59 
DONALD UNGARELLI 
water damage can certainly be considerable to the contents and the 
interior of the building. Without the aid of an automatic detection or an 
extinguishing system, the fire could spread quite rapidly and cause 
extensive destruction. It is literally water from the firemen’s waterhoses 
which causes most of the water damage to books. The intense heat and 
smoke from the flames are additional hazards to the library. However, 
today there are commercial firms that specialize in salvaging water- 
logged books and deodorizing smoke-damaged books and interiors of 
buildings. Although the costs for these operations are relatively high, 
the proper insurance coverage can cover 100 percent of the expense. 
Otherwise, the cost for salvage and deodorization must be absorbed by 
the library budget and/or the institution. 
Examples of Loss Experiences 
Texas Education Agency, Austin, Texas: 1976 
The single largest loss to books was caused in a fire at the Texas 
Education Agency in Austin, Texas on 2 and 3 February 1976. The 
building, equipment and the entire school textbook collections were 
destroyed in the fire. More than 1 million books were burned in the 
blaze. The loss was estimated at $1 million to the building and $5 
million for the books. The building did not have any detection or 
extinguishing system. There was no insurance and a special appropria- 
tion from the state legislature was necessary. 
Federal Way Branch, Kings County, Washington: 1975 
The Federal Way Branch of the Kings County Library System 
(Washington) was totally destroyed by a fire during the night in 1975. 
The fire was started in the bookdrop when two teenagers threw a lit 
book of matches into it. Because the library did not have either an 
automatic detection or extinguishing system, the fire rampaged unno- 
ticed during the night. The entire building and the 35,000-volume 
collection were lost at an estimated value of $1.5 million. The Library 
Director, Herbert Mutschler, indicated that the library did not maintain 
adequate insurance protection because it had opted for the minimum. 
Also, it did not have a sprinkler system because it was thought that a fire 
was a remote possibility. The minimum insurance coverage was taken 
on the building for $400,000, but the contents were not insured. There- 
fore, the library is now faced with the problem of raising additional 
funds for a new building as well as for developing a library collection. 
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Apparently, there is still the prevalent attitude among many library 
managers that fire and other hazards in libraries are rare and that 
insurance and loss prevention programs are expensive luxuries. Unfor- 
tunately, the Federal Way community is a prime example of this preval- 
ent attitude. The community must raise more than $1 million to rebuild 
a new library and collection when insurance coverage and loss systems 
were available at moderate costs. Until library managers become more 
cognizant of the different safeguards for protecting libraries-and, more 
importantly, their contents-the perpetuation of possible financial and 
academic losses to society will continue into the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Prevention and Preparedness 
Preventive measures reduce the probability of loss against disasters, 
and libraries, even if they are insured, should develop preparedness and 
fire-safety programs to insure that fire hazards are eliminated. Library 
managers appear to be ill-prepared to face a major disaster. Fire preven- 
tion, library inspections, emergency evacuation procedures, and life- 
safety programs are methods of preparedness that are essential, not only 
in cases of emergency situations, but also in the daily operations of the 
library. Library staff members should be alerted to the dangers or 
hazards that may cause fires. They should be instructed to practice good 
housekeeping methods to eliminate hazards. Also, staff members should 
have specific instructions about their responsibilities under emergency 
conditions, and drills should be initiated so that the staff are prepared in 
the event of such a situation. Library managers must become more 
cognizant that it is the responsibility of management to initiate protec- 
tive measures and to instruct staff of the steps needed to reduce hazards as 
well as to be prepared for an emergency. Fire Safety, Self-Znspection 
Forms for Libraries4is specifically designed for staff use. It has excellent 
evaluative forms which can be easily implemented in any library. Per- 
forming the evaluation will serve as an indication whether the library is 
prepared for a possible disaster as well as to show if corrective measures 
are necessary to prevent losses. With these forms and periodic inspec- 
tions by fire inspection personnel and other agencies, library managers 
can initiate a fairly complete life-safety and fire prevention program. 
Analysis of Risks-Risk Management 
To a library manager or governing board, risks are embodied in all 
library property both owned and used which-if lost, damaged, muti- 
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lated, destroyed, or caused bodily injury-would result in financial loss. 
The replacement, repair or settlement of injury claims would present 
the library with a serious financial liability. The very nature of insur-
ance is based on the laws of probability and estimates of the risk of loss. 
These are the basic rudimentary aspects of an insurance program. 
Library managers hold the responsibility of avoiding the risks of loss to 
both the library buildings and the contents. This is the relatively new 
concept of risk management, and it should be applied in purchasing 
insurance. Essentially, it is a method of evaluating the risks of loss, 
whereby some items should be insured, andothers with minor or remote 
risks of loss should be candidates for self-insurance. It is the responsibil- 
ity of library managers to become equal partners with the insurance 
firms in developing an insurance program to meet the present and to 
anticipate the future hazards facing their libraries. The ultimate respon- 
sibility for securing the insurance coverage falls to the library’s board of 
trustees or to the institutions’ insurance managers. However, library 
managers should seek to insure that this responsibility is adequately 
and completely met. Chapman Parsons stated: 
I am not, and do not expect you to become, an insurance expert. 
However, having some responsibility for managing the business 
affairs of the library, you should be generally aware of general insur- 
ance practices in order to be knowledgeable in advising the trustees 
and be able to speak effectively and clearly with representatives of the 
i n d ~ s t r y . ~  
Appraisals and Valuations of Property 
Another essential aspect of the insurance program is the appraisals 
and valuation of property. An inventory of the building (improvements 
as well) and the contents such as books, other library materials, furni- 
ture, equipment, supplies and fixtures is vitally important. Accurate 
and complete records of the costs are essential and should be updated 
each year. A problem, basically, could arise if there is loss and the 
records are incomplete. This could be a factor if there is a loss of less than 
the total contents and buildings, in which case the insurance company 
would probably request “proof of loss.” This is especially likely when 
only a portion of the book collection has sustained a loss. If there is 
up-to-date information about the valuation of the collection, claims are 
usually easier to be settled. But, changes in the collection must be 
reflected in the insurance policy, otherwise claim settling may be very 
costly to the library. Harold Roth lists ten reasons why libraries may 
experience difficulties in settling claims as follows: 
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1. An inventory has never been taken or is out of date. 
2. 	Shelflists and collections have never been weeded. 
3. 	Insurance coverage had not changed with a changing collection or 
with the depreciating or appreciating value of that collection. 
4. 	Collections have been arbitrarily swelled by gifts and other miscel- 
lany to hold space. 
5. 	Extensive runs of periodicals and other materials have been accum- 
ulated for the same reason. 
6. 	Used and unused portions of the collection share the same general 
areas. 
7. 	Shelflists contain a variety of information and inconsistent pricing 
data. 
8. A substantial portion of the collection and its stacks have been com- 
pletely destroyed. 
9. 	The policy covering the collection has a coinsurance feature, which 
in case of a fire, may lead to the presumption the collection is 
underinsured. 
10. There is a question as to whether books and other library materials 
are part of the contents as covered by the policy.6 
Insurance-Options 
There are several approaches when considering insurance coverage 
for the buildings and contents of libraries. Over the years, libraries have 
been designated by insurance companies and the state rate bureaus as a 
preferred class and are, therefore, eligible for insurance packages. Gen- 
erally, the package policies can essentially reduce the overall premiums. 
Libraries have been eligible for the Public and Institutional Prop- 
erty (P.I.P.) Form plan. The P.I.P. form has a $500 minimum annual 
premium and a coinsurance clause of 90 percent as well as a $100 
deductible per loss. Within the plan, the library can opt for property 
insurance coverage either on the basis of “Named Peril” or “All Risk”. 
Basically, if the perils are not listed under the policy, there may not be 
coverage. “Proof of Loss” will rest with the library. The loss must be 
attributable to a specifically listed peril, otherwise claims will be very 
difficult to settle. However, on an “All Risk” basis, if i t  is not specifi- 
cally excluded there will be coverage. Below are listed a number of perils 
which may appear in some policies as insurable perils or as exclusions 
in an all risk coverage: fire; lightning; winds from cyclones; tornadoes, 
etc.; smoke damage; explosions (steam boiler); aircraft damage, vehicle 
as well; sprinkler leakage; vandalism; riot-civil commotion; water dam- 
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age; glass breakage; building collapse; theft, robbery or burglary; earth- 
quakes; floods; employee dishonesty; sonic boom; and transit collision. 
Another important aspect is to consider whether or not to insure on 
an “Actual Cash Value Basis” or on a “Replacement Cost ValueBasis.” 
Under the basis of a loss settlement, actual cash value means the market 
value less depreciation for wear and tear while replacement cost means 
new without a deduction for depreciation. However, a word of caution: 
if the loss is not replaced, the settlement will be on the basis of actual 
cash value. Generally, if you opt for the replacement-cost value, the 
premiums may be at a higher level. 
The P.I.P. coinsurance clause is an obligation on the part of the 
insured to carry insurance at the 90 percent level at the time of loss. 
Anything less will result in a proportionate reduction in loss claims. 
The coinsurance clause can be waived by an endorsement known as 
“Agreed Amount Clause.” Each year, however, the library is required to 
file a statement of values with the insurance company and adjust the 
coinsurance amount to the 90 percent level. Essentially, both the 
insured and the insurance company have agreed that the coinsurance 
requirement has been met and will be continued for twelve months with 
this endorsement. Therefore, this will avoid any possible proportionate 
reduction in loss settlements due to underinsurance. Regular fire 
inspections are required and have to be reported to the rating bureau. 
The Blanket Coverage Form is similar to the P.I.P. form. It has a 
coinsurance requirement at 90 percent of the total value. Coverage is 
available on all risk basis and values can be insured at either the actual 
cash value or replacement cost basis. There is a $50 to $100 deductible 
per loss. The properties-buildings and contents-are included in one 
policy with a single amount of insurance. This generally avoids the risk 
of being underinsured on some items, while being overinsured on 
others. The library files a statement of values of the properties with the 
insurance company or the state rating bureau to determine the average 
rate for the blanket policy. These policies can be written for a three-year 
period. 
Besides the aforementioned forms, three other methods have been 
used to insure books and other library materials: (1) “Valuable Papers 
and Records Forms,” (2) “Special Library Policy (Hartford Library 
Policy),” and (3) “Fine Arts Policy Form.” All three policies are issued 
on a “valued basis.” That is, the library declares in advance, the value of 
the properties insured. They are “all risk” policies, without the exclu- 
sions for flood and earthquake damage. Usually, the “Fine Arts Policy” 
covers art works, pictures or other rare items. Libraries that have large 
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collections of this nature should consider this policy form because i t  
affords considerable loss protection against damage due to fire, water, 
theft and other hazards. 
The “Valuable Papers and Records Form” does not have a coinsur- 
ance clause, and loss settlements are based on an actual cash value basis: 
depreciation is deducted. The library is also required to declare the unit 
values of items by classes of property. Essentially, if the library main- 
tains accurate pricing records and declares the values appropriately, loss 
settlements should not be a serious problem. However, if the library is 
not accurate in declaring values, losses could be very costly to the 
library’s operating budget. Some insurance companies have modified 
the form to include replacement cost and to provide blanket coverage 
rather than on the basis of values by categories of materials. Thus, this 
would alleviate, somewhat, the problem of inaccurate reporting and 
make claim settlements a lot smoother. 
The Hartford Library policy (also known as “Model ALA Library 
Policy) was developed by Gage-Babcock and Associates, Inc. ALA Insu- 
rance for Libraries Committee, and the Hartford Fire Insurance Com-
pany. The library is required to report, each year, the declared values for 
either each book or the unit value per category of materials. Loss 
settlements are based on the declared values rather than on the basis of 
actual value or replacement value of individual items. There is a $250 
deductible per loss and a “full reporting clause” which, essentially, 
means a 100percent coinsurance clause. Basically, if the declared values 
were inaccurately reported (lower than the actual value), loss settle-
ments are proportionately reduced. 
Any of the above forms, as well as those mentioned previously, 
either in a combination of packages or singularly, would meet the 
insurance needs of most libraries. Several writers, including myself, 
have recommended the “Model Insurance Policy” as affording the best 
protection for contents of libraries. Oscar Trelles recommends that: 
If insurance is contemplated, the model ALA policy be chosen. How-
ever, if the latter cannot be applied in a given state or if the librarian 
decides not to use it, then a combination of the Public and Institu- 
tional Property Form with a Valuable Paper Policy and a Fine Arts 
Policy should be chosen, as these would provide equivalent protec- 
tion at a more economical cost.7 
For more complete information about the insurance concept for 
libraries, an adeptly written manual-Insurance Manual for Libraries’ 
by Gerald E. Myers-is an excellent and useful book to make library 
managers and library boards more aware of an insurance program, and 
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of the responsibilities essential in establishing that program. Origi- 
nally, this revised manual was prepared for the member libraries of the 
Illinois Library System (Bur Oak, Du Page, Northern Illinois, North 
Suburban, Starved Rock, Suburban Library Systems), in 1972. The 
manual is composed of nine chapters. Chapters three through nine 
analyze the insurance coverage and programs. They cover: (1) analysis 
of risks, (2) appraisals and valuation of property, (3) insurance cover- 
ages, policies, and policy forms, (4) new constructions, ( 5 ) insurance 
rates and premiums, (6) loss prevention and safety, and (7) losses and 
claims. These chapters will prove to be a welcome aid to both the library 
board and the library manager as an indication of the types of insurance 
programs available to libraries. Also, because of its many useful 
features-chapter one (“A Philosophy of Insurance for Libraries”); 
chapter two, “Procedures for Handling the Insurance Program”; the 
appendixes, “Sample Risk Management Statement,” “Example of 
Valuation Study,” “Analysis of Insurable Values,” “Special Library 
Policy,” “A Typical Analysis of Bowker Annual Prices,” and “Check- 
list for Library Insurance”; and a glossary of terms-this is probably one 
of the best manuals published within the last twenty years. It has all of 
the essential components for the development of a sound insurance 
program. 
Lack of Recognition of Protective and Preventive Measures 
Unfortunately, many library managers only realize the importance 
of insurance after a major loss experience. The cost of insurance is 
relatively inexpensive when one considers the protection it affords. 
Several library directors stated that they had opted for the minimum 
insurance coverage because fire was a remote possibility. After major 
loss experiences had occurred, they realized the importance of insurance 
protection. If one considers that the yearly premiums are protection 
against potential losses, they are relatively inexpensive compared to 
raising literally millions of dollars to rebuild library buildings and 
collections that were underinsured. However, protection by insurance is 
by no means the final answer. Preventive and corrective measures are 
needed to eliminate the likelihood of hazards so that losses are less likely 
to occur. Automatic detection and extinguishing systems prevent the 
spread of a fire and lower the risk. When these two systems, protection 
and prevention, are incorporated into a library’s program, its insurance 
premiums are at a much lower rate. Charles F. Gosnell goes even further 
and suggests actual dollar savings over time, as follows: 
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[If] a book collection housed in an unprotected stack is insuredat full 
value, the installation of a good automatic sprinkler system will result 
in such a reduction in insurance premiums as to pay for the cost of the 
sprinkler installation in the course of a half-dozen years. Thus much 
protection can be secured with an actual saving in expense over the 
long range, a capital investment well worthwhile! 
During a shrinking budgetary base, library managers must determine, 
as part of the decision-making process, which programs are cost- 
justified in order to rationally warrant the expenditure of funds. Insur- 
ance and loss prevention coverage are cost-justified as the best possible 
safeguards to preserve and protect the incalculable wealth of buildings 
and the contents of libraries for future generations. 
Editor’s Note: Some material from this article was previously published 
in the A L A  Yearbook of Library and Information Semices. 
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Patterns and Costs of Crime 
ALAN JAY LINCOLN 
SEVERALOF THE preceding articles suggested that, prior to implement- 
ing special security programs, i t  is advisable to assess the kinds and 
amount of losses that could be suffered. This, of course, should be done 
at the local level since problems vary from setting to setting. On the 
other hand, it is useful to have an understanding of the kinds of prob- 
lems that other libraries already have experienced. The data to be 
described here were collected in part to meet this need. 
The Library Crime Research Project is a three year study of the 
crime and disruption patterns in public libraries in all fifty states. It is a 
broad study designed to assess not only problems of crime and disrup- 
tion, but to identify many of the conditions that facilitate or help to 
control these problems. The procedure followed for each of the states 
was identical.' First, a systematic sample of at least sixty public libraries 
was drawn using the comprehensive listing of all public libraries in the 
American Library Directory. Survey questions covered a variety of top-
ics including: (1) characteristics of the library and community, (2) 
descriptions of patrons and patron use patterns, (3) experiences with 
eighteen different types of crime and disruption, and (4) direct and 
indirect costs of crime including the use of security equipment and 
procedures. A total of2920 surveys were distributed by mail and analyses 
were conducted on the 1647 surveys returned by August 1983. 
Alan Jay Lincoln is Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Lowell, Lowell, 
Massachusetts. 
SUMMER 1984 69 
ALAN LINCOLN 
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The study measured the incidence of eighteen different types of 
crime and disruption including types of (1) vandalism, (2) theft, (3) 
problem-patron behavior, (4) assault, and ( 5 ) arson. The estimates of 
crime obtained in this study tend to be conservative, in part because 
many crimes in the library are hidden-unknown to our respondents. In 
addition, some of the crimes might have been detected but went unre- 
ported. The rate of response from larger libraries was lower than that for 
smaller libraries. Since the larger libraries tend to have more crime, the 
study estimates would be somewhat low. Finally, use of the term eflzsode 
in the questions may result in conservative estimates, since an episode 
may have involved the theft of a single volume or hundreds of volumes. 
Vandalism. Six different types of vandalism were examined, 
including intentional book damage, vandalism outside the building 
and inside the building, vandalism to patrons’ and staff-owned cars, and 
intentional damage to equipment. Table 1 contains the findings for 
each of the problems. The most common type of vandalism was inten- 
tional book damage. Two-thirds of the respondents reported at least one 
episode. Just over 25 percent had more than six repetitions. 
Vandalism outside was more common than vandalism inside the 
building. Over half of the cases had experienced at least one act of 
outside vandalism, and just less than one in ten had six or more epi- 
sodes. Vandalism inside the building was less common but still a serious 
problem. Just under half of the respondents reported at least one epi- 
sode, while over 10 percent had chronic problems (six or more repeti- 
tions). Intentional damage to equipment occurred in less than 20 
percent of the institutions reporting, and in half of these cases the 
damage occurred only once or twice. 
Theft. Four kinds of theft were measured: book theft, reference 
material theft, theft of equipment, and other theft. Book theft was the 
most common offense reported. Of the responding participants, 80 
percent indicated that they knew of at least one episode of book theft. 
Out of these cases, the majority had more than six episodes. Over one 
quarter of the reports indicated that books had been stolen more than 
twenty times. 
The next most frequent type of theft was the theft of reference 
material. Approximately one-fourth reported one or two occurrences, 
and over one-fifth had chronic reference theft. The theft of equipment 
was a chronic problem for only 2 or 3 percent of the respondents. 
However, nearly a quarter of those responding had uncovered at least 
one episode. 
LIBRARY TRENDS 70 
Patterns and Costs of Crime 
TABLE 1 
PERCENTAGE LIBRARIES DISRUPTIVEOF PUBLIC REPORTING 

EPISODES PERIOD
FOR A TWELVE-MONTH 
Number  of Episodes: Percentages T y p e  of Episode At  least one S i x  or more 
Intentional Book Damage 66 26 
Book Theft 80 52 
Reference Material Stolen 63 23 
Equipment Stolen 22 02 
Other Theft 34 06 
Vandalism Outside Building 54 09 
Vandalism Inside Building 44 11 
Vandalism of Patron’s Car 13 01 
Vandalism of Staff’s Car 16 01 
Vandalism of Equipment 17 03 
Drug Use by Staff/Patron 15 03 
Drug Sale by Staff/Patron 04 00 
Verbal Abuse to Patron 28 05 
Verbal Abuse to Staff 45 13 
Indecent Exposure 17 02 
Assault on Patron 07 00 
Assault on Staff 03 00 
Arson 04 00 
~ ~~ ~ 
Note: Percentages do not add to 100 because respondents were asked to check off as many 
episodes as were applicable. 
Problem-patron behavior. Based on a review of existing studies, 
several types of problem behaviors were focused on: verbal abuse of staff 
and patron, drug use and sales, and indecent exposure. This, of course, 
excludes many other kinds of problems. Respondents indicated that 
drug use was known to have occurred in over 15 percent of the libraries. 
Drug sales were rare. Only 4 percent of the questionnaires mentioned 
the sale of drugs by staff or patrons. 
Verbal abuse was the second type of problem patron behavior. 
Verbal abuse of the staff was more common than abuse by one patron of 
another. Nearly half of the respondents told of at least one case of verbal 
abuse of a staff member. Verbal abuse was chronic in over 13percent of 
the libraries. Despite the problem of patrons not telling respondents 
about being harassed, more than one-fourth of the returns mentioned 
the verbal abuse of a patron. Nearly 20 percent were aware of at least one 
incident of indecent exposure. 
Assault. Attacks against a patron were reported by 7 percent of the 
sample. Less than 2 percent of the returns indicated that there were three 
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or more episodes which was similar to the breakdown found for assaults 
against a staff member. Three percent knew of an assault against a staff 
member but less than 1percent reported three or more assaults. Combin- 
ing the two assault items we find that nearly 8percent of the sample had 
at least one known assault. 
Arson. Arson is perhaps the most devastating crime that can occur 
in a library. A single episode can destroy the entire collection and the 
facility. The survey data show that 4 percent of the libraries had expe- 
rienced an episode of arson during the year. It is likely that many of the 
arsons reported were relatively minor, because these are substantially 
more cases than the thirty-two known episodes reported by Morris in his 
earlier article. As a summary measure, 11percent of the sample claimed 
to be free from all crime and disruption.2 
Personal uzctzmzzation. Nearly 80 percent of the librarians respond- 
ing indicated that they had never been the victim of a crime in the 
library. Most of the victimized librarians had experienced only one such 
incident, while 6 percent had been victimized more than once. 
Costs of Crime 
Assessing the impact of crime can be confusing. One useful scheme 
is suggested by C ~ n k l i n . ~  He examines both the direct andindirect costs 
of crime. Direct costs are the result of a particular episode of crime. 
These costs include the value of any property lost or damaged, the value 
of any money taken, medical costs for the victim’s injuries, lost wages, 
and so on. The indirect costs generally include any changes from the 
fear or anticipation of subsequent crime. These changes may be made by 
an individual in response to crime or at the institutional. 
Research Findings: Direct Costs 
The national survey asked respondents about the direct costs of 
crime and disruption in their libraries. They were asked to estimate the 
total losses, along with indicators of the effects of crime upon services. 
The impact of crime on services included: closing the library or a 
branch, changing operating hours, ha1 ting community programs, and 
losing the use of equipment. 
Dollar losses. Total losses due to crime were assessed by asking 
respondents to: “Estimate the total amount lost due to crime and disrup- 
tion...over the last twelve months.” Analysis of the data showed that the 
most frequent response-just over 20 percent-was “less than $100.’’ 
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Approximately 12 percent of the libraries reported no losses. Over 
one-fifth reported losses over $1000, with 3 percent reporting losses in 
excess of $10,000 (see table 2). How a particular dollar loss affected a 
library depended upon the size of the overall budget and how the loss 
was covered. 
TABLE 2 
PROPORTION REPORTINGOF LIBRARIES 
LOSSESDUETO CRIME 
Amount Lost Percentage 
~ ~ ~~ 
$0 12 
Less than $100 21 





$5,001 -$lO,OOO 3 
Over $10,000 3 
Effects of Crime 
The most serious effect on services to the community would be 
closing the library, which was reported by less than 2 percent of those 
responding. In many of these cases, arson was the apparent cause of the 
closing. Approximately 4 percent of the libraries were forced to change 
their schedule of operating hours, and several had done so more than 
once. Of those responding, 5 percent reported that they had stopped a 
community program and about half of this group had terminated more 
than one program. Finally, 8 percent of those responding mentioned 
that they had lost the use of equipment because of crime problems. 
Research Findings: Indirect Costs 
Indirect costs, though difficult to measure, may be more devastat- 
ing to an individual or institution than the direct costs of crime. The 
indirect costs are changes resulting fron the fear of future crime and 
include instituting security measures or changing personal behavior. 
Crime preuention expenses. The majority of libraries spent 
nothing on crime prevention during the year in which the surveys were 
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circulated. Of those responding, 15 percent reported spending over 
$250. Only 3 percent of libraries spent over $10,000on any type of crime 
prevention programs. Many of these libraries had security personnel on 
their staff. 
Patterns of Security Use 
The survey included questions about fourteen different security 
measures ranging from the relatively simple smoke detector and locked 
storage room to the more costly measures of book theft detection systems 
and closed-circuit television. Use of the simpler, less expensive types of 
security was the most widespread. Locked storage rooms were used by 37 
percent of the sample (see table 3). Smoke detectors and some type of 
police patrol coverage were the next most common devices or programs. 
About one-fifth of the libraries responding indicated that all the doors 
had security locks. Even though book theft was the most frequent crime 
in the libraries surveyed, only 10 percent had book theft detection 






Type of Measure Percentage ofLibraries 
Closed circuit television 1.3 

Plainclothes guards or police 2.9 

Portable signaling device 4.1 

Uniformed guards or police 4.8 

Security screcns on all windows 5.3 

Unbreakable windows 6.2 

Intrusion alarms on all doors 7.8 

Book theft detection system 10.0 

Automatic communication link with police 11.8 

Electronic intrusion system inside 12.6 

Security locks on all outside doors 23.0 

Police patrol coverage 26.1 

Smoke detector 26.6 

Locked storage room 37.0 

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 because respondents were asked to check off as many 
measures as were applicable. 
LIBRARY TRENDS 74 
Patterns and Costs of Crime 
Security personnel were relatively rare and typically found in major 
urban libraries. Examinations of the overall use of security found a 
varied range of deployment-each measure was found in some 
libraries-but that most libraries had few devices. In fact, one quarter of 
the respondents said that they had none of the specified measures. An 
additional 19 percent had only one security item, while 17 percent had 
two different items. 
Effects of Victimization 
What are the effects of having been the victim of a crime while in the 
library? Those librarians (about 20 percent) who had been victims of 
crimes were more likely to demonstrate defensive behavior patterns than 
were nonvictimized librarians. For example, only 2 percent of nonvic- 
tims carried any type of personal protection device, while 3 percent of 
those victimized once, 6percent of those victimized twice, and 17 percent 
of those victimized more than twice did so. Similarly, about 7percent of 
nonvictimized respondents indicated that they were picked up after 
work because of their concerns about crime. Those who had been 
victimized while at work in the library were more than twice as likely to 
be picked up after work. 
In sum, the costs of crime are varied. When crime occurs there are 
resulting costs. The impact of direct costs depends upon the relative cost 
of the episode in relation to the overall budget of the institution as well 
as the significance of the materials lost or damaged. The significance of 
the indirect costs cannot be assessed easily. T o  illustrate, the removal of 
photocopying services due to concern about damage to the machines 
may inconvenience many people slightly, but the fear of potential 
personal crime can seriously disrupt a small group of employees. Both 
are real costs, but the overall relative impact may be difficult to 
determine. 
Recall that approximately 90 percent of all libraries had some 
experience with crime or disruption. It appears that most of these 
libraries should consider evaluating their security procedures. The 
planning of crime prevention programs should be based in part on 
careful consideration of both current and anticipated costs of crime and 
then taking steps to minimize those potential costs. 
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PETER J. PARKER 
IN HIS FIRST LECTURE on The Forms of Action at C o m m o n Law, pub-
lished posthumously in 1909,the English legal historian F.W. Maitland 
urged that, “we should guard ourselves against the notion that ...it was 
the office of the King’s own court or courts to provide a remedy for every 
wrong.”’ Maitland’s advice is as appropriate in the United States today 
as i t  was in England seventy-five years ago, especially in the case of 
American libraries. The purpose of this article is toexamine some of the 
statutory and legal remedies available to library administrators for the 
protection of their institutions, their employees and their collections. 
The discussion will focus only upon those remedies that are specific to 
libraries and will exclude, for the most part, the larger body of law found 
in the criminal, corporate or municipal codes of the several states. The 
discussion will be necessarily general because libraries differ so much 
from one another in the circumstances of their establishment, their 
governance and their collections. And, because there is no  consistency in 
the laws governing library operations from state to state, it will not be 
possible to make anything more than some generalized recommenda- 
tions about when library administrators have no  alternative but to seek a 
legal remedy. 
Peter J. Parker is Acting Director, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. 
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It seems that library administrators are comforted by strong library- 
specific statutes, laws that make it a crime to steal a book from a library 
or to deface library property. These statutes may not really be necessary. 
Most criminal codes protect property owners against theft, malicious 
mischief and vandalism. Consequently, i t  is more important for admin- 
istrators to identify those particular parts of library operations that are 
not covered by existing law and to remedy those deficiencies than it  is for 
them to work for the passage of a more general library law that sup- 
posedly covers all contingencies. 
Indeed, the existence of a library-specific statute may be counter- 
productive. Obviously, effective law enforcement depends upon the 
cooperation of law enforcement officials. Statutes that create special 
circumstances-outside the normal, routine experiences of police offic- 
ers, prosecutors and judges-may be extremely difficult to enforce. Will, 
for example, the kind of evidence the police have to assemble in a case of 
library theft differ from that in an ordinary theft case? And, when the 
time comes to sign a complaint against an alleged miscreant, a library 
administrator must weigh the uncertain outcome of any legal proceed- 
ing against the expenditure of time and money. Throughout this arti- 
cle, then, I shall argue that “going to law” should be the remedy of last 
resort. 
The Library, Museum or Archive & Law Enforcement Priorities 
If, as Samuel Johnson propounds: “The law is the last result of 
human wisdom acting upon human experience for the benefit of the 
public,” then librarians and administrators are in bad trouble indeed. 
Or, so it would seem from many of the laws protecting library property 
drawn in more than thirty American jurisdictions. Library administra- 
tors can only conclude that their legislators have been unwise, their 
law-enforcement officials uninformed, that they themselves have failed 
to communicate the urgency of their needs, and that, in consequence, 
many Americans fail to perceive that libraries are threatened. 
The manner in which a state has chosen to govern its libraries 
affects where library laws are found in its statutes. In some states, 
libraries are under the jurisdiction of the state department of education; 
in others, libraries may be treatedas community institutions and will be 
in the state’s statutes under municipalities; and in still others, libraries 
may be a separate department. How the state has chosen to govern 
libraries may also affect what types of libraries are included in the 
statutes. For example, states that put public libraries under “municipal- 
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ities” may not include school and academic libraries in the provisions of 
this section. In states where libraries are governed by the education 
department or a separate libraries department, school, public, and 
academic libraries (as well as museum and other public-institution) 
libraries may be included. In other states, libraries’ functions as cultural 
centers are reflected in their inclusion under such departments as “Art, 
Artifacts, and Cultural Property” (Montana) and “Arts, Archives, and 
History” (Mississippi). Where states have assigned criminal penalties 
for theft, damage, destruction, or defacement of library materials, the 
penalties may be included in the laws pertaining to libraries; they may 
be cross-referenced from the library laws to where they appear in the 
state’s criminal code; or they may simply appear in the criminal code. 
Graded criminal penalties may be applied in some states according to 
the extent of the theft or damage to library property, but most states have 
assigned only one level of criminal penalties. Library crimes in the state 
criminal and penal codes are juxtaposed in amusing or perhaps trou- 
bling fashions with such offenses as malicious mischief (Oklahoma) 
and damage to playground equipment (Massachusetts). These juxtapo- 
sitions seem due as much to accidents of code revision as to legislators’ 
priorities for libraries. Nonetheless, it is difficult to perceive this patch- 
work of legislation as “the last result of human wisdom.” 
Librarians and library administrators must bear some of the 
responsibility for this state of affairs. While we may believe that our 
buildings and our collections are being abused by an indifferent public 
and that law enforcement people will only intervene when the abuse 
becomes particularly outrageous, we are fooling ourselves if we think 
we are getting any less than we deserve. All too often, as librarians, we 
have an unrealistic and parochial view of the obligations of the police 
and prosecutors to protect the institutions in which we work. 
In 1975, the Society of American Archivists (SAA)attempted to deal 
with the parochial attitudes among archivists. With the assistance of a 
grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), the 
society began a program of consciousness-raising and cultivation of 
law-enforcement agencies. They published a security manual prepared 
by Timothy Walsh, organized and administered a checklist of stolen 
property, sponsored the drafting of model legislation, and even lobbied 
the law-enforcement community with well-placed articles in several of 
their professional journals.’ The SAA offered a program that they and 
the NEH hoped would be sufficiently comprehensive to make a real 
contribution and to become self-sustaining. Comprehensive i t  was, but 
it seemed not to have engendered the support of the library community 
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necessary to keep the program going. Several explanations for that 
failure are possible: either the SAA failed to communicate sufficiently 
with the library community; or librarians, long accustomed to a high 
rate of loss of current and replaceable titles, did not realize that they had 
a common problem with their archival brethren, or most likely, the city 
and university officials and the board presidents responsible for the 
administration of archives and libraries paid little attention to the 
importunities of their paid help. 
Perhaps one of the reasons that few paid any attention to the 
information professionals in 1975 is that we had and continue to have 
an image problem which, even at our most aggressive and expansive, we 
manage to perpetuate. In the fall of 1983, some determined, angry and 
frightened archivists and librarians met in Oberlin, Ohio with dealers, 
law enforcement people and attorneys in what was known as the “Ober- 
lin Conference on Theft.” On 19 August, John Horvith, Oberlin’s news 
officer, announced the conference to the press as follows: 
Librarians, traditionally thought of as enforcers of silenre, for years 
have been speaking in hushed tones about something far more unset- 
tling than noise and lack of derorum: grand theft. 
The  undercurrent of concerned whispers has finally given way toa 
chorus of alarmed voices: formerly reticent librarians are now forced 
to battle thieves bent on emptying our nation’s best libraries of 
millions of dollars in books and man~sc r ip t s .~  
Although arch and somewhat contrived, Horvith’s introduction to the 
core of his hard-news release was certainly attention-getting (and con- 
sidering the media coverage the conference received, he seems to have 
been right on the mark). The conference itself may have been part of the 
solution, but I would argue that Horvith’s tone is part of the problem. 
Early in February 1984 the Philadelphia Daily News ran another 
installment of its “crime in Philadelphia” series calculated to instill in 
its readers yet another attack of urban paranoia. Complete with maps 
and charts, the story translated FBI and local crime statistics into the 
“human terms” with which the readers of almost any metropolitan 
daily are all too familiar. The story was really rather well crafted in an 
episodic manner: lines such as “once every eight minutes a major theft is 
reported to the Sixth Police District” were followed by vignettes in 
which the reporter described the personal sufferings and anguish of the 
victims. While many readers may have concluded that those of us who 
live and work in cities are under siege, there is another important lesson 
to be drawn from the Daily News story: for those of us who work in the 
Sixth District-where all three of Philadelphia’s IRLA libraries are 
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located-prudence rather than paranoia is the appropriate frame of 
mind, especially when one learns from the story that arrests are made in 
fewer than one in ten of the reported theft^.^ 
For a number of years I served as the security officer at The Histori- 
cal Society of Pennsylvania. Intuitively, I suppose I knew about the 
prevalence of theft in Philadelphia and how few arrests the police were 
able to make. Like many who have had little professional working 
contact with the police, I was inclined to ascribe the low arrest rate to 
police indifference. But, in June 1981, I was joltedout of this rather silly 
attitude when I called the Police Emergency Operator to report a dra- 
matic smash-and-grab. The impersonal, completely professional voice 
on the other end of the line first asked “Was anybody injured?” before he 
let me continue my report. Police priorities were correct, given the 
neighborhood of the Historical Society, but they were certainly not very 
satisfactory to an institutional security officer who thought he could 
rely upon the police to enforce the law. 
I learned a good deal about the attitudes of law enforcement people 
toward cultural institutions that summer. It was a “hot” summer for the 
city’s libraries and museums. At almost any gathering of librarians or 
museum professionals, I learned of yet another theft. I learned too about 
the many ways cultural administrators faced what was obviously a 
common problem. Some publicized their problems; others thought it 
best to contain the damage. We decided to bite the bullet: our theft and 
that from the University of Pennsylvania Museum became the subject of 
an excellent story in the Philadelphia Inquirer. Even so, the police 
seemed unwilling to match our zeal to catch the thief. After all, they 
seemed to be saying to us, only some old jewelry and paintings were 
taken; the watches stolen did not even work. Granted, the police did 
show momentary interest when they were informed that the value of the 
property stolen was in excess of $50,000, but that interest quickly faded 
when I was forced to admit that the Historical Society had neither 
photographs nor current appraisals of the stolen property. Once 
again-I realized later-the police priorities were correct: if we did not 
care enough for Historical Society property to protect i t  by normal 
registration methods, we could hardly expect the police to do our job for 
us. 
I learned too that most library and museum people were just as 
naive as I had been. We thought, i t  seems, that the presence in one place 
of all those books, manuscripts, paintings, and other precious things 
endowed the place, the collections, and those who took care of them 
with a privileged status in society. To the police, however, the materials 
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stolen from the Historical Society were simply property, not much 
different from that stolen from any private house or store in the city. To 
be sure, stealing that property is against the law, but given a choice of 
protecting life or property, few will dispute police priorities. 
Even if the police can be persuaded to carry through an investiga- 
tion of a theft of library property and to make an arrest, in many 
jurisdictions it is doubtful that the district attorney will prosecute the 
case with the vigor that library administrators would like. Many district 
attorneys will choose plea-bargaining because of the enormous expense 
of prosecution. John Hagerty, deputy for communications in the office 
of the Philadelphia District Attorney, estimates that in Philadelphia’s 
Court of Common Pleas a one-day trial, in which the defendant has 
waived a jury, costs the taxpayers $700. A full-fledged criminal jury trial 
costs $1300 to $1500.5Hagerty’s figures do not include legal fees, nor do 
they take into account the time lost from their jobs by any but police 
witnesses. Clearly, police and prosecutors have come to believe that 
prosecution is worth the effort only if they have “a good case.” It 
behooves library administrators to give law enforcement people as good 
a case as possible rather than to work for the enactment of unenforceable 
statutes. 
Discussion & Comparison of State Legislation 
Let us now examine some of the laws that protect libraries to see 
whether they are workable. For this survey, I consulted the annotated, 
consolidated codes for the fifty states as well as the District of Columbia 
and Puerto Rico. I first checked the most recently revised index available 
under the general heading of “library” or “libraries.” If I found no 
appropriate citation under this heading, I tried the more general head- 
ings of “theft” or “unlawful taking” to see if there were any citations to 
library situations. I know that I missed the pertinent legislation in at 
least one state and I may have in others. The comparative table was 
originally prepared for the Oberlin Conference but appears here in 
revised and corrected form (see table 1). 
As noted, the various state laws protecting library property have 
been codified differently in almost every state. Most are to be found in 
one of the following codes: Municipal, Library, Education, Cultural 
Property, or Criminal. Basically, the laws are of two types: type “A” 
statutes, generally enacted before 1970, which provide some protection 
against willful detaining or defacing of library property; and the newer 
type “B” statutes that are directed primarily against library theft. 
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Many of the type “A” laws contain no criminal sanctions what- 
soever, or if they do, they are so weak as not to be of any significance. 
Section 990 of Oregon’s library code, for example, establishes a min- 
imum fine of $5 and a maximum of $25 for willfully detaining library 
property for more than thirty days after receiving a written notice from 
the library. The act may penalize the act of keeping a book, but it makes 
no provision for its recovery. And, when one considers that this section 
was enacted in 1975, one can only conclude that librarians did not have a 
sympathetic ear in the legislature. 
Many type “A” laws are ineffective because they are grounded on 
the assumption that library materials are the property of a particular 
library board or municipality, and that the remedies for the recovery of 
such corporately owned property ought not to be any different from 
those available for the recovery of any other kind of private property. In 
Wyoming, for example, the law reads, “whenever library materials are 
lost, destroyed, or taken from the library ...the library board may insti- 
tute proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the 
materials or the value thereof.”( 18.7.105)The Education Codes of Dela-
ware and Idaho simply say that local library boards may “make such 
rules and regulations as [they] may find necessary.”(Delaware 14: 1707; 
Idaho 33:2605)6 In these and some other states then, a municipal library 
must become a party in a civil action that they must bring before the 
municipal or state courts. Furthermore, these laws are silent as to the 
remedies available to university or privately established libraries. 
T o  be sure, some states grant cities and towns the right to pass 
ordinances that protect libraries or their property. Such a grant is 
contained in the Arizona code, but in 1977 that state also repealed those 
sections of the code dealing with destruction and d e t e n t i ~ n . ~  In Arkan- 
sas municipal governments may do the same, and local libraries are 
empowered to “refuse the use” of their facilities to known malefactors.’ 
These are hardly criminal sanctions. Instead these laws all seem to 
assume that libraries are places where such offenses as theft andmutila- 
tion rarely occur. When they do, the library can easily replace the 
missing materials and the offender will simply receive a rap on the 
knuckles. Many of these laws were enacted before World War 11, and 
although codification has taken place in some of the type “A” states as 
recently as 1983, no effort seems to have taken place to review the 
sections dealing with library offenses. Indeed, some states, notably 
Hawaii and Rhode Island, have recently enacted library laws that are 
little more than type “A” laws.g 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































By contrast, type “B” laws have teeth. Generally they define the 
institutions protected very broadly to include public, private, school, 
and museum libraries and archives. Materials protected are defined 
equally broadly. Wha t  sets them apar t  from type “A” laws, however,is 
that they establish library theft a s  a crime. T h e  Virginia law that served 
as the model for the SAA model statute will serve to illustrate. 
SS42.1-72. Injuring or destroying books and other property of librar-
ies. Any person who willfully, maliciously or wantonly writes upon, 
injures, defaces, tears, cuts, mutilates, or destroys any book or other 
library property belonging to or in the custody of any public, county 
or regional library, the State Library, or other repository of public 
records, museums or any library or collection belonging to or in the 
custody of any educational, eleemosynary, benevolent, hereditary, 
historical library or patriotic institution, organization or society, 
shall be guilty of a class I misdemeanor. 
Ss42.1-73. Concealment of book or other property while on the pre- 
mises of library; removal of book or other property from library. 
Whoever, without authority, with the intention of converting to his 
own or another’s use, wilfully conceals a book or other library prop- 
erty, while still on the premises of such library, or wilfully or without 
authority removes any book or other property from any of the above 
libraries or collections shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof, and 
upon conviction thereof shall be punished as provided by law. Proof 
of the willful concealment of such book or other library property 
while still on the premises of such library shall be prima facie evi- 
dence of intent to commit larceny therof. 
Ss42.1-73.1. Exemption from liability for arrest of suspected person. 
A library or agent or employee of the library causing the arrest of any 
person pursuant to the provisions of SS42.1-73, shall not be held 
civilly liable for unlawful detention, slander, malicious prosecution, 
false imprisonment, false arrest, or assault and battery of the person so 
arrested, whether such arrest takes place on the premises of the library 
or after close pursuit from such premises by such agent or employee; 
provided that, in causing the arrest of such person, the library or agent 
or employee of the library had at the time of such arrest probable cause 
to believe that the person committed wilful1 concealment of books or 
other library property. 
SS42.1-74. Failure to return book or other library property. Any 
person having in his possession any book or other property of any of 
the above libraries or collections, which he shall fail to return within 
thirty days after receiving notice in writing from the custodian, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished according to law; provided, 
however, that if such book should be lost or destroyed, such person 
may, within thirty days after being so notified, pay to the custodian 
the value of such book, the value to be determined by the governing 
board having jurisdiction. 
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SS42.1-74.1. “Book or other library property” defined. The terms 
‘‘bookor other library property” as used in this chapter shall include 
any book, plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting, drawing, 
map, newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, broadside, manuscript, docu-
ment, letter, public record, microform, sound recording, audiovisual 
materials in any format, magnetic or other tapes, electronic data 
processing records, artifacts, or other documentary, written, or 
printed material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, 
belonging to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of any library, 
museum, repositoryof public or other records institution as specified 
in SS42.1-72.’0 
Several features of the Virginia law deserve comment. The strength of 
the law comes from its resemblance to shoplifting laws common to most 
states: concealment is prima facie evidence of intent to steal and the 
employee who discovers the concealment is exempt from civil action 
arising from false arrest or slander suits. But, good as i t  is, the Virginia 
statute lacks some features present in many commercial shoplifting 
laws. In most states, the presumption clause is more broadly drafted. 
Substitution ofone object for another or changing the price tag are both 
considered prima facie evidence of intent to steal. Such features could 
and probably should be adapted to library theft laws to deal with the 
more sophisticated book thief who has been known to alter a catalog or 
to substitute a lesser for a more important copy of a rare book. 
The Wisconsin law, enacted in 1979 and effective 30April 1980, has 
an important feature not found in the Virginia statute. The offense of 
library theft is graded, depending upon the value of the materials taken: 
less than $500 is a Class A misdemeanor; $500-$2500 is a Class E felony; 
and more than $2500 is a Class C felony. Penalties upon conviction are 
provided elsewhere in the criminal code. However, the Wisconsin law 
has a curious feature that deserves clarification: the subsection of the law 
dealing with library theft states that a library employee may detain a 
suspected thief “in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time 
to deliver the person to a police officer.” Several sections earlier in the 
code library officials are “privileged to threaten or intentionally use 
force” against a suspect. One wonders if Wisconsin library administra- 
tors have worked out a definition of reasonable force.” 
Most of the type “B” statutes require that the text of the law be 
prominently displayed throughout libraries. One wonders if the post- 
ing requirement is not the most important deterrent feature of these 
laws. Certainly the Illinois Library Association thought so.That associ- 
ation went to considerable expense to print and distribute the text of the 
Illinois law to member libraries. 
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The summary that appears in table 1 will enable the reader to 
compare the library laws whatsoever. The reader should not conclude, 
however, that libraries and their property are not protected in those 
states; generally the state laws against theft and the like will obtain. 
Conclusion 
Even though one’s library and collections may be covered by one of 
the laws just summarized, the existence of that legislation does not mean 
that they are protected. Obviously, successful prosecution will depend 
upon the existence of protocols and procedures within the institution 
that protect the collections before they are stolen, and should anything 
be stolen, will provide law-enforcement people with a chain of evidence 
with which they can successfully prosecute. Such was the thinking of 
the organizing committee of the “Oberlin Conference on Theft.” Peter 
E. Hanff, a member of that committee and librarian at the University of 
California at Berkeley, assumed the job of preparing a draft of protocols 
for library security. His draft touched upon five major security concerns. 
To be sure, his paper was framed within thecontext of “TheGuidelines 
for Security of Special Collections” (drafted by the Security Committee 
of the Rare Books and Manuscripts Section [RBMS] of the Association 
of College and Research Libraries), but his recommendations are gener- 
ally applicable. 
Hanff recommended that a senior staff member of a library be 
appointed security officer and the security officer should identify areas 
of library vulnerability and develop a security program which would, 
among other things, inform staff members of the legal basis upon which 
the institution operates. The security officer would, for example, coach 
the staff on such questions as whether they have the right to stop 
suspected thefts as well as the rights of a suspected thief. 
Hanff also recommended that the institutional security policy 
include a “standard operating procedure” for: (1) the aprehension of 
suspected thieves, (2)reporting thefts promptly within the organization 
and to appropriate law-enforcement officials, and (3) the prosecution of 
thieves. A more important-and more difficult-part of Hanff’s recom- 
mendations includes tight inventory control. Hanff‘s guidelines state: 
Administrators of libraries and archives must be able to identify the 
materials in the collections. Adequate accession records should be 
kept and cataloguing should be as detailed as possible. Materials 
should be routinely marked and a record of the library’s marking 
system should be maintained. Permanent records should be main- 
tained for deaccessioned materials. 
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He also recommends that the RBMS “Guidelines for Marking Rare 
Books, Manuscripts and other Special Collections” be a d ~ p t e d . ~  
At the Oberlin Conference, the participants were continually 
reminded of the inadequacy of current marking procedures. The rules of 
evidence in effect in most jurisdictions in the United States would 
require that the procedures for accessioning, cataloguing and identify- 
ing library and archival materials be well-established and preferably 
printed for distribution within the institution, and consistently fol- 
lowed to ensure that the courts would accept the identification of stolen 
material put forward by an institution.” In short, the courts want to 
know how long and how thoroughly the library has been doing things 
in the manner described. Those of us who have not had the experience of 
trying to identify stolen library property to the policeor in court cannot 
possibly imagine how mortifying that experience can be when one has 
to confess that practices one had thought quaint are seen by law enforce- 
ment people as downright culpable. 
I suspect that library administrators will have even more trouble 
with Hanff’s description of their legal responsibilities. He states: “The 
administrator...must report any thefts to the law enforcement agencies 
with jurisdiction in the area, and must take responsibility to prosecute 
thieves. Materials stolen should be reported to Bookline Alert: Missing 
Books and Manuscripts (BAM BAM).”13 Whether the materials taken 
from a library are of the quality to be listed in BAM BAM is not at issue. 
The reluctance of library administrators to parade their misfortunes 
before the public may be understandable. But it is unfortunate: neither 
the public nor funding sources will believe that theft is a real problem. 
And until they do they will neither support nor tolerate the changes in 
institutional operating priorties necessary to institute a workable secur- 
ity policy. 
Alan Lincoln has demonstrated in Crime in theLibrary that librar- 
ies are not the safe, comfortable places most Americans believe them to 
be.” The purpose of this article has been to suggest that while libraries 
may, indeed, be under siege, legal protection is available in some form 
or another in almost every state, should it  be needed. Libraries in type 
“B” states may believe that they are well protected, but they may not be 
as secure as they think. Most of the type “B” laws are of fairly recent 
passage; I saw no references to case law that would suggest that the 
courts have tried to determine what is “reasonable” force, and “reasona- 
ble” detention. Library administrators would do well to consult with 
legal counsel and law-enforcement officials when they develop library 
security protocols. The experience is likely to be mutually instructive, I 
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can assure you. For example, when I spoke with the Philadelphia police 
about Pennsylvania’s new statute, they had never heard of it. However, 
when two detectives from the city’s major crimes unit read it, they 
thought i t  workable-providing that there always be two library 
employees present when a suspect was detained. They further recom- 
mended that if an institution intends to prosecute rather than simply to 
recover library materials, the search of the suspect’s belongings ought to 
be conducted by a police officer. This may not be what the law says, but 
i t  is the way the police seem to be willing to carry it 0 ~ t . l ~* 
The laws protecting libraries are only as effective as those enforcing 
them. Library administrators and their staffs are vital parts of that 
enforcement process. 
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